

SPEARhead

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BULLETIN of the SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF EAST ASIANS' HUMAN RIGHTS

Editorial

The Crackdown in China

DEATH SENTENCE FOR "SPY" IN TAIWAN

We begin this story with a digression.

Last fall, four officials of the People's Republic of China were travelling in the Far East, and inadvertently took a flight which was scheduled to stop over in Taipei. In Taipei all passengers were required to leave the craft temporarily, and wait in the transit lounge. However, there was no incident involving the four Chinese communists. Nationalist officials even walked over and talked to them, remarking that "we are all compatriots" (HK10†111).

Nothing particularly remarkable, except that in Taiwan it is a crime punishable by death to be a "bandit." (One does not even say the word "communist.") In fact, it is a crime to "know" a "bandit" unless you report the person to the authorities.

The law that was not applied to the four gentlemen *has* been applied to others. Although
(Continued on page 10)

CONFERENCE CITES DENIAL OF TIBETANS' RIGHTS

Chinese authorities have denied to the people of Tibet most of the rights to which they are entitled under the Universal Declaration. This is the judgment of Tinley Akar, former information officer for the Dalai Lama, who spoke at a conference on Tibet held at Columbia University in New York on April 28.

Akar said that although the General Assembly of the United Nations had passed three resolutions on the subject of human rights and self determination for Tibet (1959, 1961, and 1965), the Chinese had continued to engage in "gross violations of human rights." In particular, he cited religious persecution and even numerous executions of dissidents.

Regarding the suppression of religion, Akar said that nuns and monks have been required to engage in courses of conduct which violate their Buddhist principles. Often, they had been
(Continued on page 5)

Our spring issue was not without optimism on the subject of human rights in the People's Republic of China. Although we reported on the arrest of dissident Fu Yuehua, we saw the over-all situation as one of increasing political freedom, representing a considerable improvement over conditions between 1949 and 1978.

But a few days after we went to press, there were some discouraging developments. On March 29 came the arrest by the Peking Security Bureau of editor Wei Jingsheng, reportedly as a "counterrevolutionary" (see page 25). Then, on April 4, publisher Ren Wandong and three others were taken into custody (see page 5).

How are we to interpret the arrests of these (and many other) dissidents and human rights advocates? Does the "Western" concept of civil liberties have no meaning in the context of Chinese culture? Are China's leaders enlightened and to be distinguished from other leaders around the world who deny citizens human rights? Are we being
(Continued on page 9)

我们是付月华的家属 一月十八日
凌晨六时许,付月华在家中被宣武分
局六七个人非法解系,至今有两个月了,
音讯全无。这是公安部门严重践踏
宪法的犯罪行为,是对公民权利的侵
犯。为此,我们向公安部门提出最严
烈抗议。
二月二十三日,人大通过的国家建
构的拘留条例(以下简称条例)第一
条中明确规定“中华人民共和国公
民非经人民法院决定,或者人民检
察院批准不受逮捕”,我们不禁要
问北京市公安部门,抓捕付月华是
经人民法院决定?还是人民检
察院批准?为什么不按法院、检
察院批准,而非法拘留?我们要求
立即释放,并保留至本月五日

秘密审查的某些部门和个人法律责任。
**付月华
家属**
一九七九年三月八日

Photographs of the first and last part of a poster in Peking written by the family of Fu Yuehua, protesting her arrest.

(See Sh 1, p. 6.) From the April issue of Huang-he. (See p. 4 below for a translation of the Huang-he table of contents).

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed this declaration as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations."

Article 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6. Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7. All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8. Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10. Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11. (1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country,

including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14. (1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16. (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17. (1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25. (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27. (1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28. Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29. (1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

LETTERS

April 6, 1979

To the Editor:

The editorial in your Spring 1979 issue ("Civil Liberties vs. Economic Rights") raises an important issue: Has China made a "pragmatic" trade-off of civil rights in exchange for rapid economic growth? Let me give an economist's response:

(1) Was the Chinese revolution a necessary precondition for the sustained growth in per capita GNP which has occurred since 1949? Most students of the Chinese economy, including myself, would answer affirmatively. [On this point, see this issue's Crossreference section under classification 25-C, first item. —Sh.]

(2) Is it necessary, economically or otherwise, to continue to deprive the overthrown classes of their civil rights—30 years later? I would say no; but the PRC will undoubtedly not relax strong control over "class enemies."

(3) Is it necessary, economically or otherwise, to deprive the remaining 95% of the population of elementary human rights? Of course not—and it seems that the Chinese government may be slowly agreeing.

To summarize: No one I know would argue that political repression is now necessary for economic gains, although in 1949 one could perhaps have argued differently.

Bruce L. Reynolds

The writer of the above letter is a professor at Union College.

The following letter from the State Department concerns Chinese Nationalist spokesperson Loh I-cheng, who was obliged to leave the United States after his letters critical of the U.S. government had appeared in various newspapers. See SH No. 1, p. 5.

Dear Mr. Seymour:

I have been asked on behalf of the President to reply to your letter of February 9 concerning Mr. Loh I-cheng and his departure from the United States.

On January 15, 1979, Chargé d'Affaires S.K. Hu was asked to call at the Department of State. An article which Mr. Loh, then Minister Counselor for Information, had written for publication in *The New York Daily News* and *The Washington Star* was called to Mr. Hu's attention. Mr. Hu was asked what would be the reaction of his government were an official of the American Embassy in Taiwan to publish articles calling on the people

to protest President Chiang Ching-kuo's policies and to write members of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) asking that they pass laws embodying such protests.

Chargé Hu acknowledged that such action by an official of the American Embassy would be gross interference in internal political affairs and that his government would not countenance such actions by any foreign diplomat. The Chargé said that under the circumstances it would be best for Mr. Loh to be re-assigned. Some days thereafter, Mr. Hu informed the Department that Mr. Loh had been transferred to Taipei and would depart the United States on January 23, 1979. He is now Deputy Director of the Government Information Office in Taipei.

I should also add that earlier, during the month of December, Department officials had occasion to call to the attention of his Embassy other of Mr. Loh's activities involving the making of arrangements for so-called "spontaneous demonstrations."

I would like to emphasize that Mr. Loh was not expelled from the United States; he was recalled to Taipei as a result of discussions between officials of his Embassy and the Department of State. On the basis of these discussions the authorities in Taipei decided that Mr. Loh should return home. I would also like to state unequivocally that the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China played no role in this matter whatsoever. It has never been discussed with the Liaison Office or members of its staff.

Sincerely,

Murray D. Zinoman

Deputy Coordinator

Special Coordinating Staff/Taiwan

Department of State

March 15, 1979

The concluding sentences of the above letter are in response to our statement that "we have learned from unofficial sources that Mr. Loh was actually expelled because of demands by a representative of the People's Republic of China. If this is the case, then as Americans we are extremely disturbed by this undermining of our constitutional liberties by a foreign power . . . It is not simply a matter of Mr. Loh's rights. What are just as important are the rights of the readers of the New York Times, the New York Daily News, and the Washington Star, in which his letters had appeared."

It is interesting that the State Department volunteers the information that it was the Liaison Office which allegedly did not raise the issue. Our letter had made no mention of the fact, though it is indeed our information that it was precisely the Liaison Office which had made the protest. —Sh.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. AID

The following is a list of major American human-rights legislation pertaining to U.S. foreign aid and investment, and international loans. The information was supplied to us by the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy (120 Maryland Avenue NE, Washington).

1974

Military aid. Sec. 502b, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. Sense of Congress resolution that it is the policy of the United States not to provide security assistance to nations the governments of which engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

Eximbank and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Trade Act of 1974, Jackson-Vanik amendment. Prohibits Eximbank and CCC credits to any "non-market economy" country which denies its citizens the right of emigration (chiefly aimed at the Soviet Union).

1975

AID. Sec. 116, FAA of 1961 as amended. Harkin amendment. Prohibits AID assistance to any country engaging in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, unless such assistance directly benefits the needy people.

1976

Military aid. Sec. 502b, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. Strengthens 1974 legislation by prohibiting security assistance to rights-violating countries unless "extraordinary circumstances" prevail or "on the facts it is in the national interest" to provide such assistance.

Inter-American Development Bank. Inter-American Development Bank Act of 1976. Requires that U.S. director of bank oppose loans to rights-violating countries, unless loan aids the

needy. First extension of Harkin amendment to international bank.

1977

World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, African Development Fund. International Financial Institutions Act of 1977. Requires U.S. director to oppose loans to rights-violating countries, unless loan serves basic human needs.

PL-480. Prohibits PL-480 Title I loans to country engaging in consistent pattern of gross violations, unless President certifies that counterpart currency proceeds of loan are being used for projects directly benefiting the needy.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Prohibits OPIC authorizations to countries engaging in consistent pattern of gross violations.

Eximbank. Advisory human-rights language. Eximbank directed to "... take into account ... the observance of and respect for human rights. ..." in recipient countries. (This language was weakened in 1978.)

1978

Military aid. Sec. 502b, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. Continues to strengthen 1974 and 1976 legislation by prohibiting crime control and detection equipment to police agencies and grant military training to rights-violating countries unless President certifies that there are "extraordinary circumstances" (i.e. national security and/or interests).

"YELLOW RIVER" TABLE OF CONTENTS

One of the most important publications concerned with human rights in China is the Hong Kong magazine Huang He (Yellow River). Below is a list of the contents of the April issue.

Editorial [position paper of the Chinese Human Rights Society and Huang He Magazine].

A Statement on the Suppression of the Democratic Movement by the Chinese Communist Authorities.

A Forum on the Chinese Democratic Movement [transcript of discussion].

Soldiers of the Democratic Movement: Fu Yuehua and Wei Jingsheng. By Gan Weimin. *Reference News for the Masses* [translation of an announcement about this underground periodical].

The Arrest of Ms. Fu Yuehua:

Exploration magazine (Peking): Is it Legal to Incarcerate Fu Yuehua? An Investigative Report on the Fu Incident. By reporters from various underground periodicals.
How She Was Arrested. By the family of Fu Yuehua.
Wall-poster Comments.

Who Has Provoked These Incidents? Who is Responsible for the Consequences? [From *Exploration*]

Two Essays by Wei Jingsheng:

Twentieth-century Bastille: Qin-cheng Prison. Excerpts reprinted below,
Human Rights, Equality, and Democracy: More on the Fifth Modernization.

The "Virtue" of Virtue Forest. [About Virtue Forest Prison.]
By Liang Yao.

The Democratic Movement in Guizhou Province:

Thaw magazine: Manifesto and Statement.
Enlightenment Association: On Human Rights.
New Poetry. By Li Jiahua.

A Survey of Democratic Thought in the Soviet Union and East Europe. By Yu Yecai.

Eastern Europe, 1978 [translation].

Reflections on Chinese Socialist Culture. By Cheng Zhizai.

Socialist Democracy. By Hu Wenmin.

A Program for Action: Our Experiences and Suggestions. By Xiang Xiaohui and Ma Wu.

Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China. [A translation of the Preface of Amnesty International's report.]
"Toward the Other Side." [A song from *Exploration*; Lyrics by Ah Q.]

The address of Huang He magazine is: P.O. Box 143, Seven Sisters Road Post Office, Hong Kong.

REN WAN-DING: PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE

"If no one speaks, no one will know. If we don't speak out, we will not be able to look our readers in the eye. They would not understand."

These are the words of Ren Wanding, spoken shortly before his arrest in April, along with three others who had been attempting to post an essay in Peking's Tian-an-men Square. The essay was entitled "Human Rights, and the Swindle of 'Marxism-Leninism.'"

All four were active in the League for Human Rights, which had been organized on January 1. A few weeks later it, along with six other democratic groups, had issued a call for "protracted struggle" to achieve socialist democracy. (See *Sh* 1, p. 1.) Ren, who had been officially deemed a "bad element" until mid-1978, became deputy chairperson. He is 35 years old.

Shortly before the April 4 incident, *Peking Daily* had carried an article deriding human rights as "a bourgeois slogan," and the democratic activists as "reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries." In its poster, the League responded that "the enemies of democracy have begun to attack." The *Peking Daily* writers were said to be "imbeciles" for whom "Marxism must necessarily signify the abolition of human and political rights."

"Why," the poster asked, "don't they analyze the concrete demands made by the Chinese democratic movement to find out whether it represents the interests of the bourgeoisie or those of the people?" They went on to attribute China's difficulties to the "bureaucratic system" and its "masters." If the democratic movement were to achieve its demands, they said, the bureaucrats would no longer be able to keep the positions that have procured them substantial incomes without having to be responsible to the people."

The four League members managed to mount the posters on the wall, but were immediately taken away by plain-clothes policemen.

The next day Ren's wife tried to post a protest on the near-by Monument to the Revolutionary Heroes. She was promptly arrested. □



After protesting to the U.S. State Department for sixteen months, a group of Tibet-born Americans have won the right not to have their birth place given as "China" in their U.S. passports. In a compromise, it has been agreed that neither the term "China" nor "Tibet" will be used, but rather the town or locality of birth will be indicated.

Passports reading "Tibet" had been issued by Washington as recently as 1977, even though the then-recognized Chinese Nationalist government considered Tibet a part of their "Republic of China." But in a bid to avoid offending Peking, the State Department refused to permit the name "Tibet" to appear on U.S. passports for more than a year.

The fight to correct this situation was led by the U.S. Tibet Committee, and supported editorially by the *New York Times*. (3M. Letter from India Trinley.)

Tibet Conference (Continued from page 1)

subjected to degrading treatment [05] to demonstrate to the public that they lacked miraculous power. The right to freedom of religion has been violated in many ways. Numerous monasteries have been destroyed, including one dating from the fifteenth century. Others had been converted to what the communists consider "useful purposes."

Many Tibetans have been imprisoned for political or religious reasons. For example, a sixty-year-old man was jailed for defending the Dalai Lama. Although Akar acknowledged that some have been released recently, he said that one had been promptly rearrested after being overheard saying, "By the Grace of God they have released me."

Akar complained that people were coerced into criticizing former Tibetan leaders. Those who refused to do so were subjected to humiliation or punishment. Violations of other provisions of the Declaration were alleged, including freedom of assembly [20], freedom of movement [13], freedom of marriage [16], social security [22], and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property [17].

There were numerous other speakers at the conference, which was sponsored by the U.S. Tibet Committee. Professor Robert Thurman (Amherst) noted that some felt that the religion of the Tibetans had been indirectly responsible for the country's losing its freedom, but he argued that freedom, even wordly political freedom, was an integral part of Buddhism.

Professor Alex Wayman (Columbia) also discussed the religion, describing it as "full of magic and mystery."

Dawa Norbu (Berkeley) acknowledged that the Chinese have skillfully manipulated the minority nationalities issue—once promising them independence, but later justifying Chinese domination of the minorities by the principle of noblesse oblige. Professor Albert Blaustein (Rutgers) said that in considering human rights, some people have taken too individualistic a view; it is time to pay more attention to the rights of groups.

Several speakers discussed the rationale and prospects for Tibetan self-determination. Elliot Sperling (Indiana) discussed historical relations with China, and concluded that "Tibet was never, until 1951, subject to China." Dr. Raymond Gastil (Freedom House), citing UN resolution 1541, said that the world has a double standard. When it comes to the issue of decolonization, "apparently it is control at a distance which counts." When a nation is controlled by a contiguous nation it is not considered entitled to self-determination.

Michael Van Walt discussed the legal issues, and found the Tibetan case for self-determination solidly based. The principles of self-determination and territorial integrity of states are in conflict, but "neither is absolute; neither should be dogmatically applied." Van Walt emphasized the importance of protecting human rights, which are increasingly coming to be seen as the "most important factor" in the resolution of such issues. □

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For more on human rights in Tibet, see page 21, below.

THE CHARIOT OF HISTORY

The following is a summary of a 200-meter poster written by the Enlightenment Society (Qimeng She) of Guizhou Province. Organizing their thoughts around twelve points, the writers make an eloquent plea for democracy. The essay was posted in Peking's Tian-an-men Square and was reprinted in Lien-ho Pao (Taipei), 26N.

1. All Chinese people of conscience—workers, farmers, scientists, writers, poets, artists, teachers, editors, and all those who love the motherland—arise! Fight for the new ideals, for democracy, and for man's rights!

2. Look closely at Chinese history over the past 2,000 years, over 4,000 years, or over eight or even 10,000 years, and you will seek in vain for two terms—democracy, and man's rights. Thus to realize our dreams, we must take action.

3. People of China, arise! It is time to deal with all tyrants and despots. We must render the final judgment on them and clear them out to the last!

4. We must reassess the Cultural Revolution. Superficially, it is said that Mao Tse-tung's deeds were "30% wrong and 70% right," but this formulation still shields Mao. His errors were more numerous than the people know.

5. China's several-thousand-year history produced one empire, but now it has produced a new empire. We will not allow history to repeat itself, nor will we allow the chariot of history to stop here.

6. The new idolatrous worship is more dreadful than the superstition of an earlier time. True "liberation" can come only by exorcising the new worship from the hearts of the people. Why? Because worship is the enemy of democracy and the enemy of science.

7. Change the long black night into a bright day, and change the tragedy into a drama of romance. History must be seen

objectively, but a truthful judgment is no simple matter. That is why we must examine the Cultural Revolution in the light of practice, and that is why we must do the same with regard to Mao Tse-tung.

8. All the elements against science, against truth, against practice, and against the people, and all the historical hangovers of worship have completely demonstrated their wrongfulness, and what's more they have been cast from the pinnacle to the depths.

9. Qin Shi Huang's feudal society and despotic state have gone never to reappear. Eastern mysticism must be rejected because people are no longer fools, and we must put a complete end to the calamity of despotic fascism.

10. Today there are two Great Walls of China. One is the barrier against barbarian invasion. The other is the spiritual Great Wall erected by Qin Shi Huang's progeny to maintain their tyranny. The spiritual Great Wall is the theoretical structure of feudal despotism, and we must not fail to shatter it.

11. One hundred years ago, Japan was also a feudal nation, but the Meiji Reformation wrought a great transformation. And especially America, established a scant 200 years ago, has made flying advances. China must carry out its Four Modernizations if it is to achieve development and find its future.

12. It is to promote and realize these ideals and dreams that we organize the "Revelation Society" and proclaim this manifesto.

FULL CIRCLE ON "DEMOCRACY"

September 28: It is an inevitable historical phenomenon that in the course of the dictatorship of the proletariat "some cadres become bureaucrats and violate the people's democratic rights. . . . All the democratic rights of the people [are] specified in our Constitution. . . . We must not totally ignore them." —*People's Daily*.

November 27: "People's freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, thinking, belief and person are the most important freedoms." —*People's Daily*, quoting Mao Zedong, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 971.

November 27: "To write big-character posters is allowed by our country's Constitution. We have no right to deny this or to criticize the masses for making use of democracy and putting up big-character posters. If the masses feel some anger, we must let them express it. Not all opinions of the masses are carefully thought out, nor can we demand that they all be entirely correct. That is nothing terrible." —Deng Xiaoping (*FEER*8D).

January 3: "Let the people say what they wish. The heavens will not fall." —*People's Daily*.

March 16: "We cannot be inactive against counterrevolution. Where there is proof against people, we will deal with them according to law. Where we should detain people, we will detain. Where we should arrest, we will arrest. Where we should hold an open trial, we will do so. We cannot be weak." PD editorial (*NYT*23M).

March 22: "We should not take the worn-out weapon of 'human rights'—which has long become the window-dressing of the reactionary bourgeois dictatorship—as a remedy for the problems of a socialist country." —*Peking Daily* (*FEER*13A).

March c. 29: "At present some people are brazenly disrupting social order and are saying such things as 'this is my democratic right.' This is complete nonsense. Is it possible that there will be democratic rights only when certain people are allowed to spread rumors to cheat the masses and instigate trouble? . . . These black sheep have been given the punishment they deserve to delight the broad masses." —*Zhejiang Daily* (*NYT*5A).
22 257 26M

COMMUNISM, CAPITALISM, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

The Chinese Communist Party's agency for handling both ethnic minorities and older businessmen (the "national bourgeoisie") is the United Front Work Department, headed by a well-known Mongol, Ulanhu (Ulanfu). Ulanhu has had a stormy political career, often having been accused by leftists of promoting capitalism and local nationalism. The following extracts from a speech he made in January make the first charge understandable. While many in the West are embarrassed by Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Ulanhu would probably be quite comfortable with it. BR16F

It is the historical mission of the dictatorship of the proletariat to eliminate capitalism and the bourgeoisie, to carry out socialist construction and eventually bring about communism. This is the fundamental principle of Marxism. But, after the proletariat has established its rule, the form and measures it should take "to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels: *Manifesto of the Communist Party*) and to change the capitalist ownership must be determined by the actual conditions in different countries.

Both Marx and Engels had the idea that, after the proletariat had seized power, while confiscating the property of the rebels and all those in exile, it could change the capitalist ownership of the means of production directly with the method of buying off with paper money. They held that this, if it could be done, would be more expedient for the proletariat. Lenin, too, pointed out: "... the idea was conceivable of paying the capitalists well, of buying them off, if the circumstances were such as to compel the capitalists to submit peacefully and to come over to socialism in a cultured and organized fashion, provided they were bought off." (*The Tax in Kind*, 1921.)

Most members of the national bourgeoisie are patriotic, with a history of co-operation with our Party. After the country was liberated, they again expressed their willingness to accept Party leadership and socialist transformation. At that time, moreover, China's economy was extremely backward, and as much as possible of the national bourgeoisie's capital was needed to be used to promote its development. There was no reason not to adopt democratic methods and the buying-off policy. From the strategic viewpoint of class struggle as a whole, when the proletariat pays the national bourgeoisie buys them off (paying bonuses, fixed interest, high salaries etc.), our aim is to facilitate the national bourgeoisie's gradual acceptance of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production, and the same transformation in the political and ideological fields. Obviously, paying the national bourgeoisie and buying them off is the Party's firm proletarian policy entirely in conformity with the fundamental interest of the working

class. It is at the same time a method which the national bourgeoisie is relatively willing to accept...

In line with Comrade Mao Zedong's consistent thinking and the principles and policies towards the national bourgeoisie and in connection with the actual situation today, the Party Central Committee headed by Comrade Hua Guofeng extensively solicited the opinions of workers and recently came to a decision on further applying some Party policies as they affect the national bourgeoisie. Accordingly I would like to touch on eight questions.

One, bank deposits, government bonds, gold and silver, and other belongings of many industrialists and businessmen of the national bourgeoisie were confiscated during the Cultural Revolution. Most of the bank deposits were fixed interest paid out by the state before the Cultural Revolution in accordance with the established policy of buying them off. Other items were mainly means of livelihood. All were legitimate income and private property protected by the Constitution. The Party Central Committee now decides that these confiscated bank deposits, whatever the amount, should be returned in full at once, together with interest at the bank rates; in the case of the deceased, restitution is to be made to their spouses. Other possessions should also be returned without delay. Anyone found guilty of embezzling or stealing confiscated property will be dealt with seriously in accordance with the gravity of the case.

Two, early in the Cultural Revolution, the high salaries of industrialists and businessmen of the national bourgeoisie were partially withheld or slashed, or they were given a bare living allowance. But high salary is precisely one aspect of Party policy to buy the national bourgeoisie off, and a living standard somewhat higher than that of ordinary workers and cadres allows them gradually and fairly willingly to become workers contributing their bit to socialist construction. The Party Central Committee now decides that those whose salaries had been withheld and reduced during the Cultural Revolution should in general be restored and the amounts withheld and reduced repaid.

Three, during the Cultural Revolution, the

PRISON OF VIRTUE

The now-imprisoned Wei Jingsheng was the editor of the journal *Exploration*, one of whose offending articles was entitled "The 'Virtue' of Virtue Forest," by Liang Yao. The title is a reference to Peking's oddly-named Virtue Forest Number One Prison. It was built during the Qing Dynasty by a Manchu who himself later died there.

Liang tells us that the prison is divided into three "reception centers." One, run by the Ministry of Public Security, houses people who have come from different parts of China to present grievances to the government. The two others are for people who have returned illegally from the countryside to the city. Each person here is given two steamed or rotten dumplings a day, one to be eaten with a bowl of dirty vegetable soup. Two people share a very dirty and lousy torn sheet which has not been washed for a year. They sleep on a bare and rough floor. In early 1978 a child in Center No. 3 died after falling ill and receiving no care. When a doctor went to treat him, he discovered many fat lice on him.

Much of the information is said to come from a former railway worker, Yuan Gouru, from Lanzhou. (Lanzhou, in north-west China, has been the site of many disturbances among railway workers). Yuan allegedly was detained 56 different times after coming to Peking to complain about persecution by his supervisor.

During his confinement, he was brutally and callously tortured. They burned him with a poker, punished him with electric current, and hung and beat him for as long as five hours.

Some people say these events are things of the past. Since the smashing of the Gang of Four, the state has promised to make laws and act pursuant to them. However, these wishes cannot be realized because some people cherish feudal despotism and take the law into their own hands. They do not have the slightest bit of human feeling.

"The 'Virtue' of Virtue Forest" appeared in the April issue of Huang He (Yellow River), and in Pei-Mei Daily on April 19.

private dwellings of some industrialists and businessmen of the national bourgeoisie in a number of large and medium-sized cities were requisitioned. The Party Central Committee now decides that these private houses should remain their personal property, and those that are occupied be restored for their owners' use.

...Four, in 1956, when private enterprises were placed under state-private operation, many industrialists and businessmen were made executives at various levels in these enterprises, representing the capitalist side. After the start of the Cultural Revolution these jointly run enterprises became state ones, and most of these managing people were indiscriminately sent into the workshops or stores to do physical work. As a result some people with production expertise or business and industrial management knowledge could not make use of their specialties and bring their initiative into play. This situation is inappropriate and it is also incompatible with the present speeding up of the four modernizations. The Party Central Committee decides that their work should now be properly rearranged...

Six, welfare measures and benefits have already been worked out by the State Council. Some of these, however, were not consistently carried out due to Lin Biao-"gang of four" interference and sabotage; others should be revised to suit the changed situation. The State Council in 1957 stipulated different treatments in wages and medical care during sick leave for industrialists and businessmen holding stocks worth less than 2,000 yuan and those holding stocks worth more than 2,000. Now the fixed interest has come to an end and their period of work in the enterprises has generally exceeded 20 years, so the provision is out of date.

The Party Central Committee now decides that all are now entitled to draw 50 to 70 per cent of their wages during sick leave, depending on their financial status and the length of leave. If such payment is already made according to the regulations for workers and staff (higher than this), there will be no changes. They will also enjoy free medical service as the other workers and staff in the enterprises concerned do. The same settlement as for workers and staff in the enterprises concerned will be made for industrialists and businessmen who die not in the performance of their duties. The State Council is to issue related notices on these two matters.

As to retirement, the regulations formulated by the State Council in 1962 will continue in force. During the Cultural Revolution, these regulations were not observed in some places; they should be remedied. Pensions that were reduced should be refunded.

Seven, according to state policy, the payment of fixed interest expired in September 1966. Now, in answer to some industrialists and businessmen of the national bourgeoisie who have asked if they may draw their fixed interest accrued before the deadline, the Party Central Committee said yes.

Eight, the children of capitalists, the Party Central Committee reiterates, should be judged mainly by their own political attitude and not merely their family background. They are not to be discriminated against in Party or Youth League membership, entering schools and colleges or in getting jobs.

These are the eight main items in the Party Central Committee's decision on further implementing some Party policies as they concern the national bourgeoisie. They have already been notified to the local authorities. The united front work departments at all levels are asked to co-ordinate with other related departments and carry out this work satisfactorily. □

Editorial (Continued from page 1)

parochial when we argue that Chinese society would benefit from greater freedom of expression?

We believe that those who would answer such questions in the affirmative are being condescending toward China, if not downright racist. People like Wei and Ren, after all, know little about the West. They have been deprived of information about it for virtually their entire lives. In advocating human rights, they are not responding to Western ideology; they are acting out of an awareness of how greatly China has been handicapped in recent decades by the controls on the flow of ideas and information. They reject Deng Xiaoping's notion that China only needs the "Four Modernizations" (industry, agriculture, military, and science). As Wei put it, China requires a "fifth modernization"—a less primitive, more democratic political system.

China needs to improve her political system for many reasons. To start with, it is unlikely that the drive for economic modernization can be very successful if the country is ruled primarily by repressive means. *People's Daily* put it very well in January (3†4): "To realize socialist modernization we must greatly develop socialist democracy. The Four Modernizations must be accompanied by political democratization." We might add that China's experience since 1949 demonstrates that economic development cannot get very far without foreign technology and capital. But foreign investors, who have just been burnt in Iran, are not attracted to lands where there are gulag archipelagoes. Writing in the May 11 issue of *Far Eastern Economic Review*, René Vignet explains:

In the ratings drafted by bank and corporate analysts in order to decide on loans or investments, there are more or less secret socio-political criteria, among many others. For instance, if a country has a record of frequent strikes or of political kidnapping of business executives it gets a low rating. On the other hand, martial law, lack of unions or lack of serious communication between manpower and management, or simply ferocious repression, also determine a low rating. The feeling behind this is that blood-thirsty repression of the people's natural demands leads to greater unrest in the long run, which does not fit in with big business and long-term economic cooperation.

But while there are solid economic reasons to support the "fifth modernization," there are important other reasons as well. The 2,000 young men and women who demonstrated in Peking last November 26, for example, seemed as concerned with moral and social considerations as they were with economic modernization. There were speeches about "democracy and the legislative system." And a Japanese reporter was asked about how the Lockheed payoff scandal was being handled in Japan. They wanted to know whether Tanaka's removal from office had been through political or legal procedures. The view was expressed that a social order in which "leaders and the general public are all equal" is essential (K27N†).

These people are certainly thinking more clearly than some of the contributors to the May issue of the party journal *Red Flag*. To argue that the Wei Jingshengs and Ren Wandings are being disloyal to China would seem to be an admission that the party theorists have no arguments at all. But of course if they could out-debate these intelligent young people, it would not be necessary to imprison them. (See page 6 for more on the official position on the subject of human rights.)

So, now that the democrats have helped him destroy his radical opponents in the Party, Deng has set out to dampen, if not wipe out, the democratic movement. We do not, of course, know just what the vice premier said on March 16. We do wonder why he felt so insecure about his stand that he could

HUNDRED FLOWERS

"In the more than twenty years since Chairman Mao put this [free expression] policy forward, why has it not been conscientiously applied, and what is actually blocking its implementation?" GM16†29D



only state his intentions in a secret speech to a small group of senior officials. We suspect (though those who consider human rights inappropriate for Chinese would disagree) that he knew that the public would be outraged at the repressive measures he was planning. Presumably, his views were reflected in the *People's Daily* editorial which appeared two days later. We find the narrow nationalism and xenophobia unworthy of the great Chinese nation. To what are the authorities referring when they denounce "the dirty work of certain traitors who sell national secrets and harm the national interest"? We can only think of the descriptions of the political detention centers (see pages 8 and 25). If this is what they have in mind, we are proud to participate in this "dirty work." We suspect that Deng is less qualified to decide what is in the "national interest" than is the author of the poster who wrote: "Foreigners who are concerned with the democratic movement and show sympathy are the true friends of the Chinese people. . . We thank them from the bottom of our hearts" (Sh-1). From such writers the party might well take a lesson in proletarian internationalism.

Deng Xiaoping's ideas about economics and social organization may be quite correct, for all we know. These are questions for the Chinese people to decide, and we offer no opinions on such matters. But the Chinese people cannot decide such questions if a small group of powerholders simply imprison or otherwise repress those with differing ideas. Radio Peking (2†9N) was quite right last fall when it rejected the view that "whoever has 'power' has reason, and the greater the power the greater the reason on his side." □

Taiwan Death Sentence (Continued from page 1)

Wu T'ai-an, for example, does not appear to have made much headway with his alleged communist conspiracy, in April he was sentenced to death by a firing squad.

Sentences for sixteen others were announced at the same time. Of special interest to *SPEAHRhead* readers is the eight-year prison term meted out to the popular southern Taiwan elder statesman Yu Teng-fa. Yu's "crimes": "knowing and not reporting" Wu T'ai-an; and giving photocopies of "propaganda" to some of his associates. (The "propaganda" was an article from the very respectable Japanese newspaper *Asahi Shimbun* concerning Peking's policy with respect to the Taiwan question.)

We carried an extensive report about Yu Teng-fa in our spring issue. The only aspect of the case we did not go into deeply was Yu's alleged connection with Wu T'ai-an; nor did we discuss the Wu case itself. At that time, we did not have much to go on, though we were inclined to associate ourselves with the moderate *Asiaweek's* witty remark that Wu seemed "more like a mouse than a Mao."

Fortunately, our friends in the Japan-based International Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Taiwan (ICD-HRT) have done considerable research on Wu (who is supposed to have launched his communist plot from Tokyo). The Committee's voluminous findings were published in the Chinese-language *North American Daily* on March 7.

Who is Wu T'ai-an? Based on extensive interviews with his many contacts in Japan, ICDHRT's report portrays a very unstable, "strange creature," not altogether in touch with reality. "All sources are agreed that he had a gift for exaggeration and flights of fancy."

Wu seems to have borne a deep grudge against the Chinese Nationalists because he believed that they had wrongfully taken about \$800,000 from him. We have no reason to believe that there was any truth in this, but this "psychic reality" drove him to all sorts of bizarre behavior. In January 1978 he is alleged to have phoned the Nationalist Party in Taiwan from Tokyo and threatened to join the Chinese People's Liberation Army if they did not "return" his money.

In late May, 1978, Wu left Japan for Taiwan, perhaps by boat, carrying a large crate of revolutionary paraphernalia. Before leaving he talked with a number of people about his plans. Although he had formerly been quite vocal and proud about his claimed connections with the PRC embassy in Tokyo, he now admitted to at least two people that he did not have their backing. He gave a number of people the impression that he was working with a dissident faction within the Nationalist Party.

But it seems most probable that the loquacious Wu was no one's agent. Consider the following remarks by one of ICDHRT's informants:

He often talked about revolution. Not only to me, but to *everybody*. His "revolutionary" activities were no secret. He *bragged* about them. We'd go drinking at one of the bars in the neighborhood and he'd start talking in a big voice about his impressive status. He'd even offer a job assignment after the revolution to complete strangers, people he'd never met before. There are lots of people to whom he either offered, or actually gave, special certificates, assigning them to posts after the revolution was carried out.

Another acquaintance of Wu:

People made jokes about him and his "revolution" behind his back, but never to his face, because they were afraid of him. You could not doubt him to his face, or he would get very mad at you. The best policy was just to humor him along.

And finally we are given this picture of the man whom the Chinese Nationalists would have us believe was an agent of Peking:

NEW TAIWAN RIGHTS GROUP



A new civil liberties organization, the Taiwan Human Rights Committee, was formed in Taipei in December. It is chaired by non-Party legislator Huang Hsin-chieh. The secretary is former political prisoner Shih Ming-teh.

The Committee has been active on behalf of Yu Teng-fa (see story, page 1), and other victims of Nationalist abuse. On May 20 the group issued a statement charging that Yu's trial had been unfair. It also criticized the government for attempting to impeach Taoyuan Magistrate Hsu Hsin-liang. The popular British-educated leader has had proceedings brought against him by the Control Yuan, on grounds that he spends too little time in his office. (Hsu's conception of his job requires him to spend considerable time in the field.) The Committee noted that Hsu has been popularly elected, whereas the Control Yuan members attempting to impeach him were never elected in Taiwan.

The symbol of the Taiwan Human Rights Committee is shown above. The characters mean "human rights."

Note: The Taiwan Human Rights Committee (*Taiwan renchuan xiehui*), is not to be confused with Taiwan's ironically-named *Chinese Human Rights Association* (*Zhongguo renchuan xiehui*), an anti-communist group which approves of Chinese Nationalist repression. This latter organization, in turn, is to be distinguished from the Chinese Human Rights Society (*Zhonghua renchuan xiehui*) which opposes repression in both the PRC and Taiwan, and is based in the United States and Hong Kong. The Society participates in the publication of *Huang He* magazine (see p. 4). There is also a Formosan Association for Human Rights (FAHR), comprised largely of overseas Taiwanese.

Wu was a fortune teller . . . He often used Buddhist fortune sticks to determine whether a particular plan was likely to succeed or fail. He would draw a stick and then draw another, then he'd decide. This is how he chose the date for the planned Kaohsiung uprising. His knack at telling fortunes had a number of us convinced that he had a real power in this regard. But after he said that he had studied at Lungshan Temple at Wanhua [in Taipei] I checked with a friend from Wanhua, who said the priests there had never heard of him.

We have many reports of Wu T'ai-an the Buddhist fortune teller and loud-mouthed "revolutionary." Such a man strikes us as an odd choice for the highly experienced (and atheistic) Peking intelligence services to select for carrying out a revolution in Taiwan.

Small wonder, then, that when he went to see the affable old (76) Yu Teng-fa, that Yu should not have taken Wu seriously. To Yu it was all a joke—until 5:00 a.m. on January 21, when twenty plain-clothes police arrived at his home and arrested him.

Wu T'ai-an Update

The Taiwan Garrison Command has announced that Mr. Wu was executed on May 28. For details, see Pei-Mei jih-pao (*North American Daily*), May 30, p. 1.

DEMOCRACY VS. GUIDANCE: PEKING'S VIEW

On February 1 *People's Daily* carried an editorial entitled "Uphold the Principle of Collective Leadership in the Party Committee." The concluding paragraphs discuss the "two-sided coin" of democracy and leadership.

BR23F

To exercise collective leadership, a climate of full democracy must prevail inside the leading body. In this regard, the secretary of a Party committee has an especially heavy responsibility. The relationship between the secretary and members of a committee is certainly not one between the head of a family and his dependents, nor that between superior and his subordinates, but one between an individual and the collective, in which the principle of the minority subordinating to the majority and the individual to the organization must apply. It is not permissible to hold formalistic Party committee meetings, at which only what the secretary says counts as he refuses to countenance any dissenting opinions and all the other members of the Party committee are there only in name. All major issues — involving the Party's line, principle and policy, the arrangements, checking up

and reviewing of work, the promotion, appointment, removal, transfer or handling of responsible cadres, as well as issues which involve the interests of the masses — must be collectively discussed by members of the committee. Participants must be allowed to express their views fully so that a common understanding is arrived at and a decision made on that basis. It is absolutely impermissible for one individual to make arbitrary decisions.

For a collective leadership to function properly, all members of a Party committee should inform each other what is going on in the field each is in charge of, exchange views, support and help each other, supervise each other and treat each other with understanding. Within a Party committee, there must be measures to ensure a healthy democratic life as well as criticisms and self-criticisms, especially the self-criticism by the secretary and criticism of the secretary by committee members. The committee should continually sum up experience and find out its shortcomings and mistakes in work. When a problem crops up or a deviation occurs in work, the leading cadres must first criticize themselves and accept responsibility. They must never try to lay the blame on others, or worse still, hold their subordinates responsible, and attention must be paid to safeguarding the latter's enthusiasm.

Collective leadership must be built on the basis of full democracy inside the Party and among the people. Correct leadership means coming from the masses and going back to the masses. When we say collective leadership, we certainly do not mean relying merely on the wisdom of a few members of the leadership. On the contrary, every member of the leadership is required to have wide contacts with the masses, make repeated investigations, pool together the wisdom and talents of the masses, and fully reflect their opinions and wishes.

A leading body is no more than a factory for processing the raw materials coming from the people. If members of a leading group do not keep in touch with the masses and listen to their opinions, but shut themselves up in conference rooms to "manufacture things," they

THE NEW "COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES"

Toward the end of last year, while the liberal dissidents were enjoying the full flowering of their movement before the first signs of repression against them, the security organs were not idle. It now appears that they were directing their attention against another political group, presumably to the left of the liberals, but usually given the elastic designation "counter-revolutionaries." On December 23, for example, three members of the Peking Revolutionary Committee were arrested (31D†12I). On the 27th, a large rally was staged to "expose and criticize five counterrevolutionaries" (28D†2I).

Such events were not limited to Peking. In October, Harbin radio ominously warned: "Our urgent fighting task is to deal resolute blows to counterrevolutionaries and criminals" (31o†6N). Soon, one heard of the arrest of "counterrevolutionaries" who had "viciously attacked Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou, Chairman Hua and the Party Central Committee" (4†14D). Similarly, a Guangxi public security work conference was told that "striking blows at counterrevolutionaries and criminals are urgent tasks." Emphasis was to be placed on remolding, reeducating and resettling the errant individuals (29o†1N).

In our next issue: *The Shaanxi (Shensi) story.*

cannot produce anything good. They must constantly go to the grass roots, mix with the masses, read carefully the letters from the masses, meet the people calling on them, study the views and proposals of the masses and pay attention to what is said in big-character posters.

The leading bodies must regularly carry out open-door rectification for the rank and file inside and outside the Party to assess their work, make criticisms and suggestions—all this greatly helps to improve the quality of leadership. This is something that should be encouraged.

Personal Responsibility

Collective leadership and personal responsibility are two sides of a coin. We practise personal responsibility and division of labour under collective leadership. While all important matters should be discussed and decided on by the Party committee collectively, the actual work of carrying out the decisions should be the responsibility of different individuals. One must not expect that each and every minor detail should be discussed by the Party committee, for this will lead to too many meetings and inordinately long meetings which will hold up the committee from dealing with the important issues. All Party committee decisions should also be entrusted to particular individuals for implementation. Collective responsibility must not be interpreted as nobody's responsibility.

We advocate the spirit of boldly taking on responsibility so that every member of a leading

group, under collective leadership, will bring his enthusiasm and initiative into full play and attend meticulously to the work he is in charge of. Not everything is to be submitted to the Party committee for discussion, and for the first secretary to give or not give his approval to. Party committees at all levels must have this spirit of boldly shouldering up responsibility; guided by the Party Central Committee's general line and principles, they are expected to emancipate their minds, get on with their work confidently, dare to bring up new problems, study them and handle them, instead of leaving problems they should settle themselves to their superiors.

At the moment, the Party is shifting the emphasis of its work. To speed up the work of socialist modernization is an unparalleled new undertaking. Although it is nearly 30 years since the founding of our People's Republic, for a considerable period of time we put our main effort into political movements. Even now, many comrades still have an inadequate knowledge and little experience in socialist construction work. In fact, it is something completely strange to some of them, and they are doing things more or less in a blind way. In order to provide competent leadership as soon as possible in this great revolution, leading comrades at all levels must, while working hard to acquire mastery of their job through study and practice, pay the utmost attention to bringing the collective wisdom and strength into full play and adhere to the principle of collective leadership so that this glorious tradition of our Party will become a more powerful force in this new historical period.

The above appeared before Peking's crackdown on dissidents. The following, which appeared in *Beijing Review* at about the time of the crackdown, discusses the issues more concretely, and indicates that "troublemakers" should ideally be dealt with gently but firmly. BR23M

Democracy and Guidance

The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, which was held in December last year, stressed

the need to give scope to socialist democracy. Since then, democratic life in China has made much headway. Showing concern for state affairs, many people have made suggestions on the ways and means of quickly bringing about socialist modernization and they have also openly criticized bureaucracy and other undesirable tendencies. This is really heartening.

Some problems, however, have cropped up. For instance:

- How to deal with some people's actions which are detri-

mental to stability and unity?

Last winter, a number of middle school graduates from Shanghai who had been assigned to work on the state farms in southwest China's Yunnan Province went on strike because

Cont'd, page 21



VERDICTS REVERSED AND UNREVERSED

One of the most astonishing developments in modern Chinese history has gone little noticed in the Western media: the "reversal of verdicts." We do not know how many individuals have been affected, but were the number known it would probably be astounding. As Chief Justice Jiang Hua said in October, "We still have no accurate statistics on the exact number of unjust and wrong verdicts. But one thing is certain: the number of such verdicts is considerable" (PD21†260).

To attempt to get a handle on this subject, let us look away from the metropolitan centers where the human rights movement receives so much foreign coverage, and consider an area about as far from Peking as possible. Take, for example, Red River prefecture, a remote area on the Vietnam border, populated largely by people of the Hani and Yi nationalities.

According to a provincial broadcast, there had been 100,000 "unjust and fabricated cases" in the prefecture, 87% of which were reversed last year (YN14†18D). We estimate that this would be between 15 and 20 percent of the prefecture's population.*

You have probably never heard of Red River Prefecture. (We never had). We hesitate to suggest that it is any more typical of People's Republic than elsewhere. Ethnic minorities on China's borderlands are notoriously insubordinate. But if Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" could be responsible for such wrong doing on China's most distant fringe, what could have been going on in the central areas where they really had some influence?

We do not, of course, blame Lin and the Gang for these miscarriages of justice (though Yunnan radio does). The problems rather are traceable to the structural and cultural shortcomings of Chinese politics, which are all too visible both on the mainland and on Taiwan. Our point is that such events have been extremely widespread. A few examples:

- Quzhou County, Hebei: 3,246 victims of injustice have now been officially exonerated. Included are many cadres and a former county magistrate (HEB20N†1D).
- Jingxing County, Hebei: 356 cadres were punished, allegedly by the "Gang;" 335 have now been rehabilitated (HEB20N†1D).
- Wenzhou prefecture, Zhejiang: 9,800 people had been "involved," i.e. had been labeled "special agents," "bandits," etc. (ZJ9†14D).
- Linze County, Gansu: 9,123 rural cases are said to require reexamination; 1,200 "wrong cases" have been reversed (GS10†11D).

This last example raises an important point. What about the eight thousand men and women for whom the verdicts have *not* been reversed. This is not an unusual situation. Recall that in Red River prefecture 13% are in the same situation. These are 13,000 people who Yunnan radio tells us were victims of "unjust and fabricated cases."

Elsewhere, the situation is similar. In Jilin municipality, 90 percent of the cases of "framed" intellectuals had been corrected, but the remaining cases, we are only told, were "mostly properly handled" (JL26†29N). In Shaanxi (Shensi), local authorities are urged by the provincial government to "conscientiously make a reinspection to see if there are any persecuted comrades who have not been rehabilitated." Clearly, there was a suspicion that many unjust verdicts had not been reversed (7†8D). By New Years, the verdicts for only 82% of the "unjustly and falsely framed" intellectuals in Liaoning had been

REVENGE: A DOUBLE STANDARD?

"If . . . that small handful of criminals who rabidly created wrong cases, false charges and framed-up cases are punished according to law, the broad masses of people will have outlets for their feelings against those who oppressed them, and their revolutionary enthusiasm will be heightened." LN28m†1J78

"[It is a crime for cadres to take revenge.] By suppressing democracy and taking revenge against people, such cadres violate Party discipline and the law. Serious cases should be punished accordingly."

PD15†19S

corrected (29D†21). By October, only 75% of the "frameups" in Jiangsu had been reversed (7†12).

Last fall Jiang Hua observed: "Although nearly two years have passed since the overthrow of the 'gang of four,' in some regions there are still many unjust verdicts to be reversed and many false cases to be redressed. Many revolutionary cadres and people opposed to Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four' now remain in prison or still suffer from such unjust verdicts" (PD21†260).

In the same speech, the chief justice cited "subjective and objective obstacles" preventing the more expeditious correction of unjust verdicts. The main ideological obstacle cited by Jiang was "fear." He complained that officials who should be reversing verdicts were afraid that they would later be accused of "shielding bad elements," undoing the accomplishments of the Cultural Revolution, or of "negating military control" (*fouding zhunguan*).

We have similar reports of "lingering fear" from all over China. Officials worry that what is politically "correct" at the moment will be (as it was a few years ago) "counterrevolutionary crime" when the political winds change (JX15†18D). And there is also the danger that the victims of misjustice, once exonerated, will turn on the officials who were responsible for their persecution (SN9†11D). Such fears are not difficult to understand.

A footnote on Red River Prefecture: With the political tables now turned, the former leaders are being arrested or otherwise punished by their now-power-holding opponents. Party leader Li Shousu has been arrested, along with "counter-revolutionaries" Li Yun and Yeh Chan-hung. Many others have been expelled from the Party. (Being a former Party member is a very undesirable status to have.) YN6†7J78

Verdict-reversing is a two-way street. □

Although there is still no real freedom for artists in China, the situation has certainly improved in recent years, and the results can clearly be seen in the works of art now appearing. A few examples (from recent issues of *Beijing Review*) appear on these pages.

*In 1954 the Red River *zhou* had 400,000 people. The Red River prefecture is an expanded version of the old *zhou*, and in addition there probably has been some population growth. There has been no census in China since 1953.

CROSSREFERENCE

This section is comprised of items of information arranged according to Universal Declaration of Human Rights article number (see page 2), and broken down thereafter by country or territory. If no article of the Declaration is specifically relevant, we designate the category "00." If more than one article applies, our allocation may be arbitrary.

Inclusion of an item does not necessarily imply a judgment that a violation of human rights has actually taken place. For example, we include information on the use of capital punishment even in the cases of common-law criminals (under 05), though the Declaration takes no clear position on whether or not such executions violate human rights.*

As with other material appearing in SPEAHRhead, we present this information in the belief that it will be of interest to members, but we cannot always vouch for the validity of the allegations. Our sources (usually the official media of the country concerned) are indicated at the end of each item.

A key to abbreviations will be found inside the back cover.

00-C. "Bad elements." The "labels" have been removed from most people who were designated landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries or bad elements, but a few people must retain such designations because they "really engaged in misdeeds when Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were running wild."

PD30I†1F

00-C. Nonmarital sex. Kyodo quoted a Peking poster complaining of sexual repression. The requirement of sexual abstinence until a late age called "a cruel crime which destroys the minds and bodies of youth" and results in murders and suicides of passion. Government urged not to repress premarital sex.

TK3†5I

00-MPR/C. Mongolia criticizes China. Montsame quotes *Unen* to the effect that there are millions of political prisoners in Chinese labor camps. "Gross violations of human rights have become an everyday occurrence." Citing her weak international position regarding human rights, China came in for criticism for supporting the Pol Pot group in Cambodia. It was also claimed that "Peking has not signed a single document of international law pertaining to human rights."

00-NK/SK. North Korea criticizes South Korea. In a *Nodong Sinmun* commentary, Pyongyang has charged that under the Seoul government people are "randomly and cruelly arrested, tortured, and bestially murdered."

20†22I

00-S. Security agent. Viktor Yefimovich Tyurin has been appointed first deputy minister of internal affairs in Kazakhstan.

Alma Ata 7F26F

00-TW/C. ROC plans Liberation. Premier Y.S. Sun told the Legislative Yuan that one reason his government intended to recover the mainland was so that "basic human rights" could be safeguarded (TP2†5M). Earlier, Taipei radio, citing Amnesty International's report on China (see p. 26), said that the administration of U.S. President Carter was "hypocritical" in that it said "practically nothing about human rights abuses on the China mainland, while loudly condemning the Soviet Union and many other countries for less serious offenses" (TP7†8I).

02-C. Women. In Guangxi, there are reported to be 231,000 female cadres, 22% of total cadres (GX2†13D). In Guangdong

province, preferential treatment is given people who have "only one child or two daughters" (GD6†9I). This apparently reflects the desire on the part of many couples to have at least one boy.

02-TW. Women participate in military units in Quemoy and Matsu, but there are no plans to introduce the practice in Taiwan (though the idea has apparently been considered).

TP6†8M

02-C. Family origin. Children have been "persecuted" because parents had followed the wrong political line. Actually, one should "take account of class origin, but not to the extent that it decides everything; emphasis should be laid on political performance [of the member of the younger generation]" (letter in PD, 30o†8N). Regarding admission to college, PD says that "the background of parents should in no way affect their children and other family members" (26†27A78). Similarly, *China Youth* says that, in the case of the offspring of landlords and rich peasants, one should "lay emphasis on their own political conduct, and not take family origins solely into account" (BJ29I†6F). Discrimination of this sort, says PD, is "a sign of abnormality in the democratic life of our own society and the imperfection of the socialist legal system (30†1F).

There is evidently much resistance to this approach. "Some people regard it as incorrect. They hold that there is no distinction between this stipulation and the bourgeois principle that 'everyone is equal before the law.' Thus, they maintain that this stipulation, which is not laid down from a class viewpoint, actually advocates that both revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries are equal." But according to Li Pu-ying, equality under the law is possible under socialism, and impossible under bourgeois dictatorship. "When we stress that all people are equal judicially. . . , [we] include antagonistic classes as well." PD6†7

Ethnic Minorities

02-C. Tibet. Population growth is being encouraged in the various minority areas of the PRC, i.e. about half the territory (whereas birth control is strongly promoted among the ethnic Chinese). In Tibet, the population is said to have increased to 1,630,000 (PD29m†6J). [In 1953 the population was officially put at 1,270,000, which would mean a 28% increase. This may include some ethnic Chinese immigrants. It is unclear whether occupying troops are included, said by the USSR to number 300,000 (26F†2M). By comparison, the population of the PRC as a whole has increased by well over 50%.]

In December, *Tibet Daily* called for exonerating people "involved in false, fabricated and wrong charges," and complained that local party committees were taking a "wait-and-see attitude" (6†11). The previous month it had been announced that 24 Tibetan officials who had been arrested between 1959 and 1966 ("high-echelon criminal elements of the Tibetan reactionary clique") were pardoned. Ten "enemy agents" were also freed (BJ11†13). A speech by First Party Secretary Ren Rung provided some details about prisons (7†14N). (See Documentation section for more on the commutation.)

Join SPEAHR! See page 27.

*The term "common law" is used on these pages in the sense of the first ("obsolete") meaning given in the *Oxford English Dictionary*: "The general law of a community, as opposed to local or personal customs." The "community" is taken to be the international community, and a "common-law crime" is an act which is deemed a crime in virtually all nations (acts of non-governmental non-consented violence, larceny, etc.). The essential distinction to be made (except when discussing torture, and perhaps capital punishment) is between convicted common-law criminals, and prisoners of conscience.

02-C. Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan). There have been a number of references in the media to the "China Youth National Salvation Party" (9†27S). An incident is said to have taken place after which four people were "framed" by leftists (19†27S). The Bulgarian publication *Rabotnichesko Delo* reported on a Uygur intellectual who had once served 6 years in prison (1†15a68).

02-C/S. Broadcasts to Uygurs. The U.S.-run Board for International Broadcasting ended its Uygur-language broadcasting to Xinjiang and adjacent Soviet areas shortly before Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States. However, there will be more broadcasts in Uzbek, which serves as a lingua franca among the various nationalities speaking Turkic languages. NYT9M

02-C. Mongols. Nine leaders of Inner Mongolia died during the violence of the Cultural Revolution; they have been rehabilitated posthumously (NM18†26). The verdicts have been reversed in the cases of a number of "persecuted" high school teachers and students in Hohhot. Leftists are said to have claimed that 85% of the students were "royalists and rightists." Many were injured; some killed (19†24I). Chiyatai, NM leader and former ambassador to Mongolia, was "persecuted to death" in 1968 (NM5†9I). Various false charges had been made by leftists against members of Keerchinyouichian Banner (JL13†17I).

Pravda says that there are 2,000,000 Mongols in China, but only 300,000 live in Inner Mongolia, 5% of the population of the region (26F†2M).

02-C. Languages. In past years leftists termed minority languages "backward and useless" and minority customs "vulgar." The official attitude is now changing, and official documents are supposed to be published in local languages (BJ20†1N). Last year *GM* published a careful analysis of the problem of reforming the written minority languages (19m†2J78).

Regarding Mongolian, it is said that during the Cultural Revolution teachers dared not use it, and many books in the language were burned. In January, however, it was reported that the language was being used in 4,400 classes, and over 300 books have been published. NM9†11, BJ14†26

02-C. Peng Zhen quoted in *Pravda*: "We have violated the [correct] course . . . on the questions of the rights of national autonomy, finance and policy, on the questions of freedom of religion, of preserving or transforming national customs and of the use of national languages. . . ." 26F†2M

02-J. Moslems in Japan. Arab charges of discrimination against many of Japan's 30,000 Moslems were denied by Public Information Minister Hido Kagami, who said that they enjoy "total freedom of religion." HK1†7M

02-S. Soviet minorities policies criticized by Peking Radio, demonstrations over language issue reported (22†26I). Reuters reported that Mustafa Dzhemilef was sentenced to four years' internal exile. Dzhemilef, 36, has long been active on behalf of his fellow Tartars, who were exiled to Central Asia by Stalin and have not been allowed to return to the Crimea. NYT6M

Political Executions in China (Cultural Revolution)

05-C. High Officials. The executions or "deaths from persecution" of the following important Chinese leaders has been announced in recent months:

Liao Lyuan, high agricultural official

Xu Zirong, Vice Minister of Public Security

Liu Xiwu, Deputy Secretary of the Supervisory Committee of the Party Central Committee (the above: BJ25†26I)

Li Ta (perhaps the same person who was a founder of the Communist Party) (BJ12†19D)

Long Qian, advisor to State Publications Bureau (BJ6†9F)

Zhang Jichun, Party Central Committee member

Xu Haidong, Former Central Committee member

Wu Zhipu, Central Committee member

Liu Changsheng, Central Committee member

Wang Shiyong, Central Committee member

Nan Hanchen, chairman, Council for Trade Promotion and participant in 1911 revolution

Liu Yumin, Minister of Building Engineering (the above: BJ24†25I)

Zhang Linzhi, Minister of Coal (BJ23†25I)

Pai Chien, Vice Minister of First Ministry of Machine Building (BJ9†13D)

Wang Xinyuan, First Minister of Light Industry (BJ26D†3I)

There are also many reports of people having been driven to suicide, e.g., Minister of Culture Yu Hui-yung (Cheng-ming HK†7J78).

05-C. Local Officials (by province):

Anhui: 120 people died in the infamous "Secret Verdicts" case "as a result of cruel penalties" (16†22N). Four opponents of the leftists were sentenced to death in 1970 (25†28N).

Guangdong(Hainan): In 1967 a local Party secretary "died as a result of persecution" (15†19D). In 1972 Deputy Party Secretary Yang Shaomin died of illness after torture (26o†).

Hebei & Tianjin: Yang I-chou, a leader of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and member of the National People's Congress died in 1969, apparently as a result of "persecution" (TJ28o†1N).

Heilongjiang: A leading Harbin Communist Party official was "persecuted to death" (20†26F). Zhang Ming, former deputy secretary of provincial Youth League, died as the result of "persecution" in 1968 (11†20S). Some other opponents of the leftists also died (3†6D).

Hunan: Wu Shu-chi, educator and vice chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference, "died under persecution" in 1968, after being tortured. He was condemned as "a landlord who managed to escape undetected," "a spy for the Central Statistics Bureau," and a "bourgeois academic authority" (29N†1D). A provincial procurator was "persecuted to death" (11†17I). Prefecture leader Hu Yun-chu, branded a "capitalist roader and revisionist," died of "persecution" in 1967 (30D†3I).

Jiangsu: Provincial official Wang Fan died in 1967 after being persecuted (21†30N). Former vice chairman of the Physical Culture Commission Shen Chan-pin "died from persecution" in 1967 (21N†1D). Executions of falsely accused persons in Yangzhou (7†12o).

Jiangxi: A leading educator was "persecuted" and died in 1966 (JS17†21N).

Liaoning: Wang Po-chin, former secretary of the Secretariat of Shenyang (Mukden) municipal Party committee, died "under persecution" in 1967 (9†13N).

Peking: Liu Ren, a top aid under Peng Zhen, died as the result of "persecution" after his arrest in late 1966 (PD12†15I).

On the deaths of members of the faculties of Peking's universities, see below under Article 26.

Qinghai: Provincial luminary Wang Zhao was physically abused and as a result died in prison in 1970 (BJ19†22I).

Shaansi (Shensi): See our next issue for an account of the political violence in the Xian (Sian) area.

Shangdong: Two provincial leaders died during persecution in 1968 (BJ13†20o). In Tsaochuang, many were abducted, some killed (22†30N). In Chang-wei County there was a "white terror" primarily affecting the Youth League (7†12o).

Shanghai: Former mayor Cao Diqu was "persecuted to death" in 1976 (BJ7†11o). Sixteen "democratic personages" (i.e., not members of the Communist Party) were "persecuted to death" (30N4D).

Sichuan: 47 high-level provincial functionaries were executed, including two vice governors, a Party Standing Committee member, the mayor of Chengdu, and commander of a military sub-

district. Forty have been rehabilitated posthumously (261†1F).

Tibet: Vice Chairman Wang Qimei died "from persecution" sometime between 1967 and 1972 (BJ25†261).

Zhejiang: A woman who was a top provincial judge died as a result of "persecution" in 1967 (20†27D).

Executions in China (Recent)

05-C. Red Guards. Zhang Feng, Yu Lanqing and Li Zuolin were charged with "murder, rape, robbery, occupying public buildings, and imposing illegal sentences" in 1967 and 1968. After their executions a criticism meeting was held, attended by 37,000. BJ1†2F

05-C. A foreign diplomat who travelled north of Peking tells us that he observed a poster which described how a convicted man had been subjected to "slow death," i.e. shot in various parts of his anatomy until he died.

05-C. Execution justified. Legal officials have been saying that the death penalty will not be abolished, and that the designation "counterrevolutionary" will continue to be applied (HK6†81). But a Peking prison assistant warden has been quoted as saying "only certain individuals, guilty of towering crimes and bitterly hated by the people are executed among criminals convicted of offenses like murder, arson, rape, robbery or heading gangs of ruffians" (XH21†22F78). To legitimize this position, Mao Zedeng is quoted: "Those who owe blood debts or are guilty of other extremely serious crimes and have to be executed to assuage the people's anger, and those who have caused extremely serious harm to the national interest must be sentenced to death without delay" (BJ21†22F78).



05-C. Prison death. 600 students and teachers accused authorities of having "disguised as suicide" the death of Xu Xunlang, a pro-Deng student in the prison of the Northwest Agronomic Institute in March 1977. Officials had claimed that Xu had died of "an overdose of sleeping tablets," but a BJ poster signed by 618 people said he had only a small quantity, and was in fact beaten to death. 311†1F

Information on Torture will be included in our next issue.

07-C. Legal equality. In a speech to the Heilongjiang Party Committee, Tang Lanting emphasized the equality of all people before the law. "We must strictly distinguish between what constitutes a crime and what does not. For years, this distinction has been confused." BJ6†8F

On the implications of one's family class background, see above under 02.

09-C. Due Process. Steps are being taken to prevent abuses by China's Public Security Bureau. Last May, *People's Daily* said: "The People's Courts should use the new constitution as a weapon to safeguard the people's personal freedom, democratic rights and proper economic interests, correctly handle contradictions among the people, strengthen unity, and heighten the

enthusiasm of the masses for building socialism . . . Repression of democracy, retaliation, private interrogation, extortion of confessions by compulsion and giving credence [forbidden]." BJ28†31V

In October, former Supreme Court president Dong Biwu was quoted in *People's Daily* as having said in 1957: "To arrest people, public security people must have prior approval of the procuratorates; it is illegal to arrest people without such approval." BJ19†20o

John Fraser of the *Christian Science Monitor* (22F) reports on the draft law on detention presented by the minister of public security. Warrants will be necessary to arrest other than those suspected of serious common-law crimes. Evidence must be submitted to a court within three days to justify arrests, at which time the courts must either sanction the arrest or the person must be released.

Fraser adds, "During the past month I have spoken to two men who were held in prison for more than a decade without any formal arrest or trial being held. One of them, somewhat dazed by his recent release, indicated that there are still 'many others' in prison or work camps."

In Zhejiang, 8 cadres were arrested in 1976, and paraded through the streets with duncecaps (14†20o). In Liaoning, ten were arrested arbitrarily and "prosecuted in kangaroo courts," then jailed or driven to death. The verdicts in the cases of 2860 cadres, (and?) 3,500 intellectuals have now been reversed (JL25†28S, 21†27D). Many pro-Zhou Enlai demonstrators were arrested in 1976, not only in Peking (BJ17†21N), but probably in most provinces (e.g.: HEN18†21N, HB18†21N, SX17†21N, HEB24†27N, JL22†29D).

09-C. Mrs. Mao's Imprisonment. In 1978 the Hong Kong magazine *Zhengming* (e.g. o) carried numerous articles with information about the present condition of Jiang Qing. The No. 8 issue said that she is in prison near Peking, occupying a spacious room, is constantly watched on closed-circuit television. Physically, she presented a very poor appearance. (See also No. 12.)

09-C. An unnamed leading Hunan leftist was arrested last fall.

09-C. The internationally-known diplomat Qiao Guanhua is reported by *Zhengming* (no. 13 p. 26†3N) to be under house arrest.

09-C. A teenage boy was arrested in Peking for protesting his parents' imprisonment. AFP10†14N

09-C. Guangdong. Three officials on Hainan Island have been arrested as "counterrevolutionaries" for "viciously attacking central leading comrades" and other alleged crimes. 21†22N

09-C. Two peasants were arrested on January 28 for demonstrating at the Great Hall of the People, and were apparently sentenced to five years imprisonment. AFP31†1F

09-C. Leftists in Xinjiang have been arrested, and are to be "punished according to law." 30N†1D

09-C. "Counterrevolutionaries." Five former Shaanxi officials are in the custody of police. They are said to have opposed Zhou Enlai. 27†30o

For more on recent arrests of "counterrevolutionaries," see story, page 11.

09-C. Independent judiciary. A Zhejiang judge considered a defendant innocent, but was pressured [presumably by leftists in the Party] into giving a "counterrevolutionary" a three-year prison sentence (BJ14†18D). Such abuses are now to be ended, says *People's Daily*, which devoted three pages to the subject on January 5. Wrote JL University law instructor Qiao Wei: "the role of the Party in the courts should be confined to the selection of qualified personnel and then educating them politically" (†91).

12-C. Libel. *GM* carried an article on legal reform urging writing into law a provision for punishing those who make false accusations. 22D†4I

The Chinese media abounds with examples of false accusations (e.g., HL1†4D, BJ19†22I, HEN31D†5I).

13-C. Freedom of movement will be examined in our next issue.

14-HK&TW. Refugees from Vietnam. Hong Kong, already heavily impacted with refugees, is struggling with the problem of what to do with the new arrivals. *FEER* 30M carried an excellent account on the subject by Mary Lee. The problem is that other countries are rarely willing to accept them.

In Taiwan, a Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Indo-chinese refugees of Chinese origin would be given consideration for admission to Taiwan, but only after they declared their intention to permanently resettle there (which he assumed few would be willing to do). The spokesman did not appear willing to acknowledge his government's obligation to accept the passengers of the *Juey Fong*, whose first port of call had been Kaohsiung. HK3†4I

14-J. Jews. Japan's tentative plans before 1941 to resettle European Jews in Manchuria are detailed in a forthcoming book by Marvin Takayer and Mary Sagmaster Swartz entitled *The Fugu Plan: The Untold Story of the Japanese and the Jews During World War II*.

14-T/Bhutan. King Jigme Singye Wangchuk has denied reports that Tibetans in his country are being ill-treated. He insisted (interview, *FEER* 9F) that they are treated generously, and being helped to integrate into the Bhutanese community. The king responded to charges of torture of Tibetan prisoners, and discussed the policy of urging Tibetans to become citizens. He was concerned about efforts by the exiled Tibetan leadership in India to prevent the integration and naturalization of Tibetan refugees in Bhutan. "Therefore, the government of Bhutan is left with no other option than to discuss this very serious development during the spring session of the Tsogdo [National Assembly]."

16-C. Marriage. Shanghai is acting to join separated families of professional people (BJ3†6D). The *N.Y. Times* (22A) carried an article by Fox Butterfield on the subject of divorce in China. "Asking for a divorce can be asking for trouble."

17-C. *The question of private property will be examined in our next issue.*

Religion

18-C. Buddhism. An article by Tim Brook in the Winter 1978 *Contemporary China* recounts the increasingly tolerant official Chinese attitude toward religion. Included is a translation of a poem by the head of the Chinese Buddhist Association, which had first appeared in *GM* 12o. Buddhist Temples are being restored in Sichuan, and 59 monks and nuns (ages: 49 to late 80s) are reported to be at Mt. Omei (a center of Buddhism since 200 A.D.). One said, "Religious activities are protected by law so long as they are conducted in temples." A small number of pilgrims come from all over the country without government interference (BJ4†6N0). Gyalsei Ngawanglosang, who had been imprisoned between 1959 and 1978, has been amnestied. He used to be worshipped by Tibetans as a living reincarnation of Buddha (8†11D). Three Lhasa temples are reported renovated and being used again for worship (JM23F).

18-C. Islam. The Koran is being reprinted in Kunming (*China Talk* #2).

18-C. Catholicism. On May 16, 1978, a memorial service was held for Ignatius Pi Cho Che, chairman of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (3,000 members), and archbishop of Shenyang, who had died. High officials, including Ulanhu, laid wreathes. BJ24†25m78

18-C. Protestantism. A few churches are reported opening, including Shanghai's St. Trinity Cathedral (Anglican). AFP6†7S
Most church buildings in China, even near hotels frequented by foreigners, are closed and in a very decayed condition.

18-U. Religion in USSR. The existence of 20,000 registered local congregations is cited by *Nosoye Vremya* (New Times), which claims that the country has religious freedom (Moscow 15F†1M). A study of Soviet Islam by Talib Saidbekov, based on Russian and Arabic sources, has been published by Nauka Press (†17I). A *Pravda* article cited readers' views regarding the poor quality of atheist literature, which often fails to deal with topical issues. Works "frequently seek to raise only general problems and do not consider the specific conditions of a particular oblast, kray or republic" (22†9F).



19-C. Whistle-blowing. Ye Jianying on the draft constitution: People have the right to control government organs ("the superstructure") including educational institutions. "All well-meant criticism from the grass roots and masses should be warmly encouraged. People's right to expose evil doers and evil deeds in state organs should be fully guaranteed." However, "dictatorship" over "the enemy" should be strengthened. XH1M78†

Guangdong Party Secretary has encouraged cadres to speak out (9†14N). Officials such as provincial leaders should welcome criticism from the masses (3 letters PD 8†9N). PD upholds Party members "democratic rights" including right "to hold different views with regard to the decisions or directives of the Party organs" (6†7S).

Zhou Enlai (1961) quoted: It is wrong when "only one person is allowed to speak and all others are forbidden to. . . . No one in this world speaks correctly 100% of the time. . . . Even when they are correct, they may say something inappropriate or go a bit too far. This calls for criticism" (BJ4†8). [In the current context, this remark may be taken as a refutation of Mao's infallibility.]

19-C. Secrecy. Taiyuan radio has emphasized the importance of protecting state and Party secrets (12†15M78). [In Peking also, dissidents have been charged with giving non-public information to foreigners. See under 20-C.]

19-C. Sampling of fates of people who attempted to assert above-stated rights: Anhui: The problem of people having been "persecuted" has not yet been "thoroughly solved." Some of the offending individuals apparently had grievances against Deng Xiaoping, and have not been exonerated (21†27N). Shaanxi commune member Wang Chien-chuan was sentenced to eight years for supporting Deng at the wrong time (22†27F). Liaoning: 1,943 cases of people considered (but not usually formally declared) "rightists" have been redressed (31†8F). Ninety-three of 97 "rightists" have been exonerated. Some had questioned a Central Committee member's qualifications to give a lecture on Leninism (BJ23†25I). Inner Mongolia: people were persecuted for allegedly participating in a "Neiren" criminal opposition group, which is now said not to have existed (28D†2I). Pro-Zhou Enlai demonstrators in Heilongjiang (2†4D) and Jilin (1†4D) have now been exonerated.

19-C/T. Peking-Taipei telecommunications. A phone call between the Peking and Taipei offices of AFP caused embarrassment in the ROC government, which called it part of a communist conspiracy "damaging [to] the morale of the people." A protest was made to Tokyo, through which the call was routed. (Because of Taiwan's automatic phone system, it is difficult to prevent such incoming calls.) HK10†12M

19-SK. Kim Tae-chung's kidnapping by the KCIA was protested by two assemblymen, who were in turn charged by the ROK government of violating a presidential decree forbidding political criticism. O Sae-ung is currently under investigation. 29†2F

19-N&SK. Literature exchange. The National Assembly in Seoul plans to send nonpolitical literature to North Korea in hopes that it will lead to continued exchanges. In the past, books have been sent to various countries including the Soviet Union. 3†6F

19-SK. Journalist detained. Japanese reporter Kihoshi Ishii was held for three days questioning before being expelled from South Korea. He says he was allowed only eight hours sleep during the period, and was forced to write a 60-page confession. Ishii had interviewed Kim Tai-chung.

19-SK. Mainichi Shimbun's bureau chief in Seoul, Yasuhiro Maeda, was expelled from South Korea on January 12 because of "malicious, distorted reporting." In particular, he had related the opinions of some students, scholars and journalists. †8&15I

19-C. Films seized. Japan Broadcasting Corp. TV films showing a mass attended by Kim Tai-chung were confiscated at Kimpo airport because they might disturb the social order (TK31D2I). [There were many such seizures in 1978.]

19-C. Press freedom in China: See next issue of *Sh*.

Trans-frontier information (see also, 19)

20-C. U.S. press services. United Press International and the Associated Press have been allowed to station two reporters each in Peking. XH is expected to have correspondents in Washington. NYT16M

20-C. According to "informed sources," Chinese authorities have warned dissident activists to refrain from **exposing domestic conditions** to foreign newsmen. K1D†

20-C. Foreign students in China will no longer be allowed to room with Chinese. NYT11&15A

20-C. AFP has quoted a taxi driver as saying, "I'd like to meet you more often and learn English, but our leaders tell us it is not allowed." Another taxi driver talking to a former passenger in a hotel lobby was asked by police if he knew the foreigner. When he explained that he had simply given the person a ride, one policeman said, "That's lucky for you." Paris 27†28D

21-C. Elections in China: See next issue of *Sh*.

21-NK. Pyongyang broadcast procedures for DPRK elections.

23-C. Rehabilitated "bad elements." China's PD has said that a GD farm brigade is wrong in paying only 70% of the standard rate to former landlord families (11†19D). The paper said that people who had been released from prison should be treated the same as people who had not been imprisoned, even if they are still designated "counterrevolutionaries" or "bad elements." "They should not be asked to work without pay," and in fact should receive equal pay for equal work, though it is appropriate to withhold honor awards from them. 30†1F

23-C. Unions. *Red Flag* has called for guaranteeing "workers' democratic rights as masters of the country (*dangjia dsoju*). Unions should facilitate greater worker involvement in the running of factories. Also [but apparently lower priority] should "do a good job in the collective welfare of workers and further improve the workers' material and cultural standards." BJ13†16N

23-C. Accusations. A large number of Jiangsu union officials were "falsely or unfairly accused." Investigation of 76% of the cases has now been completed. 9†13N

23-MPR. Mongolian Unions. The rights of trade unions are being expanded. The constitution is being amended to allow unions to conduct legislative initiative. 27D3J

23-MPR. Income. In 1978, (per capita?) income increased by 470 tugriks, compared to 1975. No total per capita figures or more recent comparisons are available. 1†27F

23-TW. Taiwan workers. A new labor law was drafted in December. It concerns minimum wages, pensions, restrictions on hiring youths under 15, etc. Employers are required to compensate employees for injuries sustained on the job.

23-C. Food. China's per capita grain is reported to have decreased since 1957, during which period the population has grown by 300 million (NYT24A). A thousand hungry people rioted in Chengdu; thirty were killed as the riot was suppressed and five were subsequently executed, according to Chinese Nationalist reports (*Free China Weekly* 11N). According to an article in PD, in Guyuan County, Ningxia, per-farmer yield has decreased from 902 pounds in 1949 to 418 now (NYT18A). See also Eberstadt work (below, p. 26).

25-C. Nuclear fallout. Six thousand Uygurs participated in a XJ rally against nuclear tests, according to a Chinese Nationalist report. Large numbers of people and animals are alleged to have died from China's above-ground bomb detonations. TW8M†

25-C. Housing. In Heilongjiang, urban housing is to be increased from the present 2.8 to 5 square meters per person by 1985, according to First Party Secretary Yang Yi-chen. 26†30I

25-TW. In 1978 Taiwan produced 2.5 million metric tons rice and 1.5 mmt sweet potatoes; 6.1 million hogs were slaughtered. 3†5F

26-C. Educators persecuted. A now-pardoned Chinese teacher was sentenced to 20 years hard labor in 1968 as a "counter-revolutionary" (JX15†18D). Peking University historians Xiang Da and Wang Jian were "persecuted to death" (GM2†12D). Chinese Peoples University President Wu Yu-chang, c. 90, "and a large group of cadres, teachers and workers who were attacked, framed and persecuted" have been rehabilitated. Wu died at the time (GM29D†9I). In Shanghai, 3,000 people in colleges and universities were "arrested, criticized, or forced to write 'confessions' and conduct self-examinations." Librarians were also affected (BJ12†26M78). The Vice President of HN University died in 1968 "as a result of savage persecution" (20†24I). A GM "Commentator" article cites ten years of "persecution" in a college in Hebei (BJ5†13N). 261 school teachers in Changchun have been rehabilitated (JL5†6J). Ping-Pong coaches Jung Kuo-tuan and Fu Chi-fang "died under persecution" in 1967

Visitors to China are constantly told that although China has its shortcomings, they are all due to the misdeeds of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" (Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenxian). So it is with past human rights violations, which are readily admitted, but usually blamed on Lin and/or the "Four."

In the following essay, Professor René Goldman of the University of British Columbia, examines the Lin-Four thesis. (This is from a longer in-progress work of Professor Goldman's.)

IS THE "GANG OF FOUR" TO BLAME?

Such explanations are spurious on at least two counts:

(1) They give the misleading impression that such misdeeds never occurred before 1966, when it is well known that persecution, detention without trial, sentencing on fabricated grounds, inhuman treatment of prisoners and the like, have occurred all too frequently throughout the history of the People's Republic of China. Mass mobilization campaigns, in the course of which institutional procedures gave way to the organized lawlessness of the "struggle meetings by the masses," with individuals arraigned as "targets of struggle" for campaign purposes (often driven to suicide), were frequent in the 1950s and 1960s.

(2) We are told that the abuses have been "violations of socialist legality." However, repeated domestic complaints (such as those of the Li-Yi-Zhe group), testimonies of former prisoners, the Amnesty International Report [see p. 26] and official admissions have established in the existing laws and their implementation a looseness that amounts to a virtual absence of such legality. Dr. Tsien Tche-hao, one of the leading authorities on the Chinese legal system, characterized the Chinese constitution of 1954 as being in reality "a statement of purpose coupled with general directives, rather than a constitution." The traditional constitutional freedoms it offered to the citizens were hedged with the warning that they are subject to the state progressively creating the material conditions necessary to their implementation. (*La République Populaire du Chine*, p. 23.) The National People's Congress, which it instituted as "the highest organ of state power" never fulfilled that purpose, as all the major decisions were made by a small circle of men in the Party Politbureau.

Finally, in offering such explanations, China's leaders beg important questions as to the democratic or even socialist nature of a system. Individuals are so powerless in the face of the state apparatus of repression, that excesses victimize ordinary citizens as well as Party and government leaders, without even the latter being able to defend themselves and obtain redress from slanders, false accusations and arbitrary punishment. All proportions guarded, one is reminded of Nikita Khrushchev's lame attribution of the crimes of the Stalin era to the "Personality Cult" and of Italian CP chief Palmiro Togliatti's rejection of that analysis as un-Marxist. . . .

Let us note that in one and the same breath, China's press is now calling for a sound legal system that would guarantee the people's freedoms, while clinging to the fetish of "counter-revolution", which not only is anachronistic in this age of stability and national development, but can only serve to justify continuing repression of dissent. Over the past two and a half years world opinion has grown accustomed to the ritualized scapegoating of Lin Biao and the "Gang of Four" for all that went wrong in the last decade of Mao's life. Such superficial explanation is scarcely more credible than Khrushchev's attribution in 1956 of the crimes of the Stalin era to Beria and the characterization of these mind-boggling crimes as "mistakes and distortions" in an otherwise unimpeachable system. By blaming evil individuals, instead of looking into the system for faults that made the evil actions of these individuals possible, the Party hierarchy reinforces the crypto-Confucian tradition of government by ritual that breeds disbelief and cynicism and imprisons Chinese political thinking in a straightjacket of conformity.

(BJ24†26J). Historians associated with the journal *Shijie Zhishi* (1934-1966, 1979-) were 'persecuted,' and some died. The "memory of these comrades" is now being honored: Jin Zhonghua, Feng Binfu, Wu Jingsong, Liang Chunfu, and Wang Depeng (†6F).

Scientists and technicians persecuted.

27-C. CAS. In the China Academy of Sciences, 360 researchers have been rehabilitated. "Some of the comrades are crippled, and some were persecuted to death." Among those exonerated: Tung Ti-chou, Hua Lo-keng, Pan Shu, Chao Chi-chang, Yeh Tse-pei, all of whom had been stigmatized as "reactionary academic authorities" (KM21ot1N). The number of formerly imprisoned CAS scientists may run into the hundreds (BJ30N†1D).

27-C. Engineering. Chang Ching-yuan, dean of the Shanghai Engineering College, died in 1970 "due to long and severe persecution." 5†7D

27-C. Agronomy. Forty scientific personnel and other cadres were falsely labeled "special agents" or "counterrevolutionaries" at the Henan Tobacco and Beet Institute. Five were "persecuted to death." BJ16†19S

27-C. Petroleum. Nine leading cadres of China's most important oil fields at Daqing were "cruelly persecuted" and died after mental and physical torture. BJ16†28S

27-C. Technician. Sang Wei-chuan, a Shanghai technician and critic of the leftists, was imprisoned and tortured in 1975. Sang has now been vindicated. BJ27†28S

27-C. Appropriate employment. Two thousand scientists and technicians in Yunnan (who apparently had not been engaged in work related to their expertise) have been transferred to proper posts. 6†13N

27-C. Medicine. An elderly doctor who had been banished to Xinjiang: "For years we have taken the wrong path. Now we must catch up. If the young ones cannot learn and manage by themselves, then we old ones must come back to help." After not practicing medicine for 15 years, he has been cleared of "rightist" charges and offered a teaching job at a neighborhood health center in Shanghai. FEER16M

27-C. In Guangdong, 307 scientists have been rehabilitated. 20D†12I

27-C. In Manchuria, 506 intellectuals, including scientists, engineers, teachers, and others, all of whom had been "persecuted," held a rally. JL17†19J78

27-C. People's Daily: "We should fully trust and boldly use capable specialists of all kinds. We must not fear ungrounded charges such as 'pursuing a specialist line.'" [Advocating specialization was politically dangerous until 1977.] The paper said that China has 25 million "intellectuals," 90% of whom were educated since 1949, and most of the remainder (educated in "the old society") have been transformed into working-class intellectuals. 4†5I

27-C. Foreign books are reprinted in both China and Taiwan without permission of the original publishers or payment of royalties. China claims the right to do so under a 1903 treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, but is nonetheless considering drafting a copyright law and entering into agreements with Western publishers. NYT8m

27-C. Information on the question of freedom in the arts will appear in our next issue.

27-NK. Experts. Emphasis must be placed upon proper ideology, although economic development must be suited to "the reality of one's own country, and there is a need for a more scientific foundation," according to the North Korean newspaper *Nodong Sinmin*. 281†1F

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH KOREA

People's Korea, a leftist weekly, published this list of South Korean political prisoners in its April 18 issue.

MUN IK HWAN, 60, Presbyterian minister, is imprisoned on charges of violating the "presidential emergency measure No. 9" (EM-9) in connection with the publication of the Mar. 1, 1976 declaration for democracy and national salvation. Although he was once released by the so-called "presidential parole," he was re-arrested soon.

PAK HYONG GYU, 55, Presbyterian minister, was sentenced to five-year imprisonment and forfeiture on charges of "agitating students" and violating "EM-9."

CHO HWA SUN, 44, Methodist minister, is detained on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "Friday prayer meeting" incident.



KO YONG GUN, 46, Presbyterian minister, is detained on charges of violating "EM-9."

KANG HUI NAM, 59, Presbyterian minister, was sentenced to ten-year imprisonment and seven-year forfeiture on charges of violating the "anti-communist law" and "EM-9."

YUN BAN UNG, 68, Presbyterian minister, was sentenced to three-year imprisonment and forfeiture in connection with the publication of the Mar. 1 declaration.

SONG GI SUK, former professor at Chonnam University was sentenced to four-year imprisonment and forfeiture on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the publication of "a guideline for our education."



KYE HUN TAE, member of the national council for democracy, is under detention. His charges are not made clear.

LI YONG HUI, 50, former professor at Hanyang University, was sentenced to three-year imprisonment on charges of violating the "anti-communist law" for his study of Chinese literature.

AN JONG PIL, 42, chairman of the Tonga struggle committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "civil rights note" incident and the "Oct. 17 bulletin" incident.

HONG JONG MIN, 35, secretary-general of the Tonga struggle committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "civil rights note" incident and the "Oct. 17 bulletin" incident.

CHANG YUN HWAN, 43, member of the Tonga struggle committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "letter to journalists" incident.

AN SONG YOL, 41, member of the Tonga struggle committee and of its human rights sub-committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "Oct. 17 bulletin" incident.

PAK JONG MAN, 36, member of the Tonga struggle committee and of its human rights sub-committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "civil rights note" incident.

KIM JONG CHOL, 35, member of the Tonga struggle committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with his writing a "letter to jour-

nalists."

CHONG YON SU, 33, member of the Tonga struggle committee, is now on trial on charges of violating "EM-9" in connection with the "civil rights note" incident and the "Oct. 17 bulletin" incident.

CHANG GI PYO, 33, the writer of the poetry "voice of people," was sentenced to three-year imprisonment on charges of "slandering the state."

KIM JI HA, 38, poet, was sentenced to life-time imprisonment, which was later reduced to 20 years, on charges of violating the "anti-communist law."

RYANG SONG U, 35, poet and former teacher, was sentenced to five-year imprisonment and forfeiture on charges of "slandering the state" in his author, the "note of slaves."

KIM MYONG SIK, 35, Jesuitical missionary, was sentenced to three-year imprisonment for the publication of his satiric poetry, the "ten chapters on the study of history."

PAK YANG HO, 32, the author of the fable "mad bird," is now under detention on charges of violating the "anti-communist law."

JAPAN KOREANS:

CHOE CHOL GYO, 47, owner of amusement business, was condemned to death on charges of violating the "anti-communist law."

CHIN DU HYON, 51, official of the "federation of south Korean residents in Japan," was condemned to death on charges of violating



the "anti-communist law" in connection with the "north Korean spying case."

PAEK OK KWANG, 31, secretary-general of the "chamber of the south Korean youth in Japan," was condemned to death on charges of violating the "anti-communist law."

LI CHOL, 30, graduate of Koryo University, was condemned to death on charges of violating the "anti-communist law."

KANG JONG HON, 27, undergraduate of Seoul University, was condemned to death on charges of violating the "anti-communist law."

KANG U GYU, 62, executive of Daiei plastic company, was condemned to death on charges of violating the "anti-communist law" in connection with the "liberal unification council-north Korean spying case."

SO SUNG, 34, graduate of Seoul University, was condemned to death on charges of violating the "anti-communist law" and the "national security law" in connection with the "campus spying case."

SO JUN SIK, 30, undergraduate of Seoul University, was sentenced to 15-year imprisonment on charges of violating the "anti-communist law" and the "national security law" in connection with the "campus spying case." He was released last year after serving his prison term, but immediately detained again with the "public security law" applied to him. He is still under detention.

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DOCUMENT: TIBETAN POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED

It is difficult to say anything positive about the human rights situation in Tibet (see article, page 1). There have been some encouraging steps in recent months, but it should be noted that many of those who have opposed Chinese rule of Tibet are still referred to in this document as "criminals" (fifth paragraph). "Rebels" who had served out their sentences are to have this label removed.

The last group of 376 prisoners who took part in the armed rebellion in Tibet in 1959 have been set free as an expression of leniency by the judicial organ of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

In March 1959, the reactionary clique of the upper strata in Tibet violated the agreement on the peaceful liberation of the region, colluded with the international reactionary forces and staged an armed rebellion in total disregard of the patient education and persuasion by the Central People's Government.

After the quelling of the rebellion, democratic reform was carried out in Tibet. Towards those who had taken part in the rebellion, the judicial organ adopted the policy of combining punishment with leniency and reform through labour with ideological education and providing them with the opportunity to earn a living. This has achieved good results. The overwhelming majority of the criminals admitted their

crimes and were later released in groups. They have switched from their former reactionary stand to one of loving the motherland and the people and supporting socialism.

The prisoners just released are those who committed the worst crimes. Among them are 16 officials above the seventh rank in the former Tibetan local government and nine living buddhas and *kanpo* (abbots) from various big lamaseries.

In celebrating the 20th anniversary of the launching of democratic reform in Tibet, mass rallies were held in Lhasa, Qamdo, Xigaze and other places on March 17. At the meetings it was announced that the last group of criminals were to be released and the designations of some 6,000 rebels, who had served their sentences and been assigned work or had undergone reform through labour under surveillance in society, were to be removed. Thus all those who began serving their sentences in 1959 for having taken part in the armed rebellion have

now been given lenient treatment. The releasees and the other rebels whose designations have been removed now enjoy the rights of citizens while proper arrangements have been made for their life and work. Prior to this, they visited the rural areas, factories and historical relics in Tibet and saw for themselves the tremendous changes that had taken place. Deeply moved by the enormous progress in the last two decades, they have made up their minds to contribute to the socialist construction in the region.

Speaking at the mass rally in Lhasa, Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region Raidi once again expressed the hope that Tibetan compatriots abroad, including Dalai Lama, would realize their mistakes and return to the motherland at an early date. He also reiterated the Party's consistent policy that they would not have to account for their past mistakes and they would have the freedom to return and leave the country again. BR30M

DEMOCRACY AND GUIDANCE, continued from page 12

they had complaints against management there. Of course, such action is safeguarded by the Constitution which guarantees that the people have the freedom to strike. They sent three representatives to Beijing who were received by Vice-Premier Wang Zhen. After listening to their case, the Vice-Premier had a heart-to-heart talk with them. While supporting their reasonable demands for improvement in the work of the state farms, he patiently explained the state's policy and expressed the hope that the young people would place the stability and unity of the country above everything else.

Early in the 40s, Vice-Premier Wang Zhen led the great production campaign at Nanniwang, which turned this desolate place near Yanan into a good farming area. He was Minister of Reclamation prior to the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, and many state farms in the border regions had been set up under his personal charge. His words greatly enlightened the three representatives. After returning to Yunnan, they sent a telegram to the Vice-Premier, in which they acknowledged their mistake of calling a strike and promised to devote their energy to building up the border regions.

• How to deal with troublemakers?

Early this year, some Shanghai young people who had been assigned to work in other places left their posts without permission and returned to Shanghai to demand that they be transferred back. They stopped traffic on the thoroughfares and stormed into municipal government buildings, abusing and beating up the cadres there.

Their rash actions and abuse of democratic rights were severely censured by the local people who demanded that measures be taken immediately to stop them. They said that it

們應該允許每一個國家都有它自己的優先選擇權利 (PRIORITIES)。但是有一點十分重要，公民必須有權利從事政治鬥爭，只有這樣，他們才有可能改變各國原有的優先選擇權。至於這些優先選擇權應該達到什麼程度，這就不是人權問題的範圍了。

問：照這麼說來，則公民自由與生活水平彼此卻有密切的相互關係。例如罷工權，既屬於公民自由，也是一種經濟方面的「人權」。

答：正是如此。無論什麼地方，只要在經濟上受到剝奪，我們就容易發現，問題的中心，往往牽涉到對公民自由的否定。凡是發生飢饉的時候，多數是由錯誤的農業政策或分配政策所造成。例如最近，已承認因為政策錯誤之故，在中國某些地區發生飢荒，而且又說，這些錯誤政策，人民是不准反對的。當然，所有這些情形，都被稱為是所謂「四人幫」造成的，但這顯然是一種誤導的解釋。問題倒在於缺乏思想和新聞的流通。

有些人爭辯說，由於過分採取以適應經濟上的需要，以致剝奪了公民自由是合理的。事實恰恰相反。將人民關進牢裏，並不等於讓大家都餓死。反之，有許多時候，往往因為有了言論自由，人民反而吃得飽。

問：除了國際特赦會與亞細亞人權協會之外，還有什麼別的有關中國人人權的組織嗎？

答：有。例如中華人權協會、台灣人權協會、台灣保衛人權的國際委員會等，都是有關這方面工作的。

問：在你看來，人權問題在中華人民共和國與台灣，前途如何？你覺得有希望或是悲觀呢？

答：實現人權，在任何地方，都需要持久的鬥爭，但就這兩個地方而論，我認為是有希望的。這因為在這兩個地方，人民都有一種潛在的情緒，對於這一點，我心裏是從不懷疑的。當一個人看到了英勇的男女們敢於冒着生命的危險而喊出人權的要求時，他不能不衷心受到感動。北京出現大字報，要求人權，這是最有鼓舞性的發展。現在，中國的領袖們已經注意到他們剝奪了公民自由表達的權利，因此，這些領袖們提出要實行法治問題。

台灣的情況也相似。在去年十二月流產了的競選運動中，非國民黨的候選人發表聲明，宣稱：人權是「最神聖不可侵犯的基本權利」，他們還說：「國家和政府的價值，就在於促進與保障人權」。雖然他們的人權講壇 (platform) 指公開發表的場所或文字——編者按) 已被政府禁止，但是潛在的情緒是無法鎮壓的。甚至連許多國民黨的候選人，也在他們的競選文件中提到人權 (雖然他們提得很不明確)。

總而言之，政府要無視人權問題，越來越困難。人民遲早要獲得人權。



considerable number of leading cadres are not accustomed to and do not understand the need to respect and protect the people's democratic rights. On the other hand, some people are not accustomed to and do not know how to correctly exercise their democratic rights. For this reason, the commentary stressed, it is necessary to pay attention to giving proper guidance.

The commentary stressed: (1) Resolutely give scope to democracy, support the masses' reasonable demands and help them solve their problems. Explanations must be given if certain problems cannot be solved for the time being. (2) Resolutely criticize those who make trouble without any reason and try to fish in troubled waters; these people should be

given proper education and prevented from creating disturbances. Those who are bent on practising anarchism and breaking the law must be properly dealt with.

Stability and the four modernizations are now uppermost in the minds of the Chinese people. This is the most important thing. In a big country like China, for some people in some places to make trouble does not in the least affect the overall situation. With the Party and the government implementing the policy of giving scope to democracy and at the same time paying attention to giving it proper guidance, stability and unity will surely be further consolidated throughout the country.

was unreasonable and unfeasible for these young people to demand that they be transferred because they already have been given jobs elsewhere. The press also commented that while giving scope to democracy, it is necessary to maintain normal order in production and in the society at large.

This produced the desired results. Many of the young people who had gone to Shanghai returned to their posts.

Why did a handful of people make trouble? An important reason lies in the pernicious influence of Lin Biao and the "gang of four" who, while imposing a fascist dictatorship over large numbers of cadres and ordinary people and undermining socialist democracy during the Cultural Revolution, flaunted the banner of "making revolution and rebelling" and incited others to "overthrow all." This led to anarchism, poisoning the minds of many people, the young in particular. Some of these young people were egoists, pure and simple, who stopped at nothing in pursuing their own selfish ends.

A short time ago, Renmin Ribao published a commentary entitled "Conscientiously Do a Good Job in Guiding the Promotion of Democracy." The commentary pointed out that a

不能真正替台灣人民(不僅台灣本地人,而且包括所有住在台灣的人)講話。這種情形,甚至連聯合國最後也得承認。如果國民黨實行一種比較現實的政策,它可以避免去年十二月的危機,但是因為缺乏人權,結果政府便傾向於相信自己所製造的宣傳。

問:關於台灣的政治犯,例如李敖、柏楊和陳菊都已釋放。柏楊已恢復在台灣報紙上寫文章,但是別的人就沒聽說過,我們對台灣現行政治犯的消息所知不多,你可否就這方面對我們的讀者談談?

答:李敖是六十年代很著名的作家,他因為直言不忌,遭到很大的折磨,所以他自從出獄之後一直沈默無言,是可以理解的。陳小姐一向在「幕後」活動,現在已恢復這種作用。去年冬天的競選活動中,她是「台灣黨外助選團」總部秘書的負責人。

但是在台灣,還有許多政治人物和作家仍在監獄裏,他們的人數,在一九七五年蔣介石逝世後減少了一些,近幾個月來可能又增加了。其中最著名而且是最殘暴的案件,就是台灣人黃華事件。黃華完全是一位自學成功的作家,現在在台灣正在坐第三次牢。他所犯的「罪」就是因為他是民主、人權和非暴力政策有效的發言人。

不幸得很,台灣繼續拘捕政治異己分子。最近特別嚴重的是「台東事件」。此案主要人物是一位僧人名叫釋修和,他是當地最大廟宇的主持人,又是台灣政治上獨立的著名人物黃順興的支持者。政府說該廟的一位客人被發現藏有中共的宣傳品。除了釋修和之外,另有六人被捕,其中包括女國大代表高XX以及陳文雄和黃宗禮等,所有這些人,都是熱烈支持黨外人士的。國民黨逮捕他們,顯然是想削弱在台灣選舉中的競爭力量。這種手法似乎是「自由中國」的政治模式。

問:在中國大陸,違反人權的情形更為嚴重。國際的人權組織近來已開始注意這個問題。我們知道國際特赦會倫敦總會的秘書會經寫信給華國鋒,表示關心中國的政治犯,特別是有關李一哲的命運。最近,國際特赦會還發表一份關於中國違反人權的詳細報告。它是否得到北京方面

面的什麼反應嗎?

答:在國際特赦會發表中國報告之前,此報告草稿會寄請中國政府評論,並表示願將中國政府的評論意見作為附錄附在報告裏發表,但是沒有得到答覆,所以只好就這樣發表了。該報告全文一百七十六頁,對中國的人權情況各方面會作過廣泛調查。其中涉及「政治犯」這一觀念在中國的涵義、審判制度、勞改和刑罰政策、監獄狀況以及釋放(大赦等)的情形等。報告的最後部分是五個個案研究,即:林希翎(一九五七年被捕的法律系學生);王明道(一九五七年因貼基督教新教標語被囚);強巴·洛桑(西藏僧人,於一九五九年被捕);鄧清善(在一九七〇年「一打三反」中被捕)以及李正天,即你提到的李一哲大字報中的一位。

問:為什麼國際特赦會在這個時候發表中國報告?中國問題是否被作為專案來處理?

答:幾年來,國際特赦會對許多國家發表過同樣的報告。一九七五年發表一份差不多同樣分量的關於蘇聯的報告。次年,又發表了一份關於台灣的較短報告。此外,又發表了關於巴西、智利和印尼的報告。中國報告因為這方面可靠的具體資料不易搜集,所以要花較多準備時間。

問:談到人權問題,你認為中國的條件與其他國家是否相同,或者說,中國的文化或經濟是否使它成爲一個特殊的國家?

答:人權就是人權。我認為對每一個國家採用同樣的標準是很重要的。當然,人權的範圍包括許多(聯合國的人權宣言共有三十條),但是像國際特赦會這樣性質的組織,不可能涉及所有人權問題。特赦會基本上所關心的是兩個問題:(一)不准對人刑訊或執行死刑,這一點適用於所有人民,不僅指「政治犯」而言;(二)不准僅因信仰關係或表達意見而遭受關禁。這兩點對中國人民來說,確與其他國家一樣。再說,這些權利遭到侵犯,不僅個人遭殃,整個社會都要遭殃。如果我們說中國人民不需要這些人權,這簡直是對這個偉大民族的一種侮辱。人權對中國是有利的,正如它對任何其他國家有利一樣。

問:我們知道國際特赦會因為對世界人權運動作出

非常的貢獻而獲得諾貝爾和平獎。你可否告訴我們一些有關這個組織的性質嗎?

答:國際特赦會是一個不屬於任何政府的組織。它在三十五個國家有分會,而且在非洲、亞洲、歐洲、美洲和中東共有二千個地方支會。

它們是國際特赦會的「骨幹」。每一個工作小組都在為別國(非本國的)若干良心犯(Prisoners of conscience)的釋放而從事工作。通常是,在共產國家營一個囚犯工作,那末在右派的獨裁國家裏也至少要選擇替一個囚犯工作,以盡量保持不偏不倚。國際特赦會歡迎任何人參加成為會員,無論他的政治立場如何,只要他真正有興趣於人權工作便可。

問:司馬督先生,你也是東亞人權協會的會長。可否請你談談東亞人權協會的情形?

答:東亞人權協會是一個比較新的組織,正如它的名稱所示的,它所關心的是在中國、台灣、南北韓等國的人權。就地理觀點來說,東亞人權協會的範圍比國際特赦會窄,但在人權範圍來說,它倒廣了些。我們強調人民除了表達的自由之外,在生活上還必須享有某種程度的水準。因此我們主張工人有罷工權和集體的工業行動權。

問:你提到這一點很有意思,因為上面你所提到的人權,都只是關於公民自由方面的人權。你覺得「人權」在經濟方面的權利,應該包括些什麼?

答:世界人權宣言上有許多關於經濟、社會和文化方面權利的條文。我們的確需要隨時記住,如果一個人處於飢餓狀態的時候,其他什麼權利都變得無足輕重。我應該說,一個人必須有維持生活的最起码食物和遮避風雨的居處,這是他的絕對權利。但問題在於,更進一步,該達到什麼程度才算是所希望的「人權」呢?所以談經濟權利方面的絕對條件比談公民自由方面的絕對權利要難得多。依我看來,政府決不應該有限制言論自由的權利,我認為這是它對一個國家所擁有的統治權的極限。

人們在要求一系列經濟方面「人權」的時候,往往忽視了,這事實上就是限制政府的統治權。例如有人說,在人權範圍上,政府應該提供某種水平的工資,這就等於它在否決政府

訪司馬晉先生

紐約特約記者海楓

談中國人權問題

司馬晉 (JAMES SEYMOUR) 先生現任紐約哥倫比亞大學東亞語文系客座教授，又在私立紐約大學任教。他是東亞人權協會 (SPEAHR) 主席，又是國際特赦會有關中華人民共和國與台灣的人權問題顧問。爲了讓「觀察家」讀者了解這兩個協會的活動情形，以及司馬晉先生對中國人權問題的看法，我特地進行了一次訪問。承司馬晉先生在百忙中接受訪問，並整理爲文字，而且對一些中文人名和引句都作了詳細的註釋，以便利我們的翻譯，謹在此致以萬分的謝忱。

The March issue of the Hong Kong magazine *Observer* carried this interview with SPEAHR's chairperson.

問：你認爲在中華人民共和國與台灣的人權問題應該包括哪些內容？同這兩個地區現在所面臨的其他問題相比較，人權問題的重要性又如何？

答：我認爲沒有什麼問題比人權更重要的了，人權問題的確是解決許多重要社會問題的公分母。其理由有二：第一點理由與人道主義有關。人權必須承認人的尊嚴，而人的尊嚴，比起政府常常顧慮關心的什麼民族主義、增加國民生產等許多問題要重要得多。

第二點理由，當公民自由不受尊重的时候，則社會問題就常常會採用粗暴的方式來「解決」。這因爲沒有一個領袖是無所不能的；沒有一個人能完備解決所有一切問題。他們需要一切的忠告和批評。但是當人民只允許表達政府所認可的政策的話，這些忠告和批評便不可能出現。於是政府與人民之間的對話受到窒息，政府領導者所得的消息越來越少，他們的思路越來越窄。

問：這些話是頗爲理論性的。你可否將你的思想聯繫到中國的實際情形？

答：像我這麼一個外國人，若談北京政府要實行怎樣的社會政策和經濟政策，是不恰當的，縱使許多熱心支持北京政府的人士也承認以往的政策曾經發生過嚴重的錯誤。毛澤東的確是世

界史上偉大的領袖之一，但他對他所賦予權力

的人所造成的錯誤，是不能推卸責任的。其實，這些錯誤，與其說是個人的過失，毋寧說是制度問題，因爲這種制度在錯誤政策造成嚴重禍害之前，不允許公民「大聲疾呼」(BLOW-ING THE WHISTLE)。政府的領導人

應該傾聽公民的批評。即使這些批評錯了，也無傷大雅。若是批評得對，而且領導者聽取他們的意見，那就是社會之福了。如果持異議者懼怕被關禁，那末國家領導人便得不到異議者意見的益處。

問：你能否講得更加明確些？

答：好的，讓我們看看五十年代的中國吧。如果共產黨在一九五七年肯聽取批評，那末在六十年代初期便可以避免許多痛苦。可是事實並非如此，結果批評者被宣佈爲「右派」，許多人受到關禁。當時因爲聽不進許多關於經濟合理發展的建議，所以導致一九六〇年之後的可怕危機和經濟的總崩潰，甚至到處饑荒。如果允許問題充分而公開地揭露出來，這些錯誤的效果或許可以避免。

問：這點對內政來說，或許是確實的，但是言論自由對外交和國家安全來說不是很危險嗎？一個國家對其他國家講話的時候，難道不須論調一

致嗎？

答：五十年代，批評中國親蘇政策的中國人都受關禁。但是到了一九六〇年，甚至連毛澤東也承認親蘇政策對中國和對社會主義都不利。其實親蘇政策並非像五十年代所宣傳的那樣明智，而蘇聯也不像五十年代之後所宣傳的那樣壞得可怕，如果一個政策沒有了批評的聲音，那末制訂政策者便傾向於走極端。一個政策若是走了極端，便不是一個好政策。只有批評才能使國家領導者迅速覺醒過來。近二三十年來中國外交政策某些愚笨方面如果允許讓人民公開討論的話，它將越加合理。

我們看看台灣的情形，也可以說明這個問題。國民黨的領袖們常常好像在說夢話。他們將收復中國和蒙古人民共和國當作基本目標。這些目標對台灣之外的人來說，都認爲是很可笑的。但是在台灣，大家都怕進監獄，所以連笑都不敢笑。雖然台灣的經濟情形比大陸好，但是我相信，如果國民黨不將寶島的資源如此大量花費在軍備上的話，台灣的生活水準還會更高。台灣政府自認是中國的合法政府，這種神話，也是他們不允許台灣本地人在政府裏佔有足夠代表的基礎。但是誰也不准說這是一個神話。因爲剝奪了人權的結果，使得台灣政府

The thoughts of Wei Jingsheng

Democracy or a new despotism? That was the question a dissident editor posed for Deng

The special edition of *Tansuo* which led to the arrest of Wei Jingsheng, headlined "Democracy or new despotism?" was the first direct attack on Deng Xiaoping by the new civil rights activists, who had previously seemed to support him.

It seemed to be, in many ways, a question to the ruling group. And perhaps the arrest of the magazine's publisher was its answer. Extracts from the text show how strong the criticism was:

Everybody is well aware that the Chinese social system is not democratic and that this lack of democracy has broken up the development of the whole society for the past 30 years. We have the choice between a social reform towards a fast improvement in production and livelihood or to go on with the Mao type of dictatorship with its bad consequences for production and livelihood...

This project is not the project of a limited number of odd individuals: this is the fate all Chinese society wants to organise for itself... and this force is invincible. Just think that on April 5, 1976, even the almighty [an allusion to Mao Zedong] did not escape the verdict...


If we go back to the speech last March 16 by Deng Xiaoping [to cool down the democratic ferment in Peking] it is clear it was an abuse of the confidence the people entrusted to Deng to slam the democratic movement. Why charge the democratic movement with all sorts of crimes and the failure of the economy when it remains the responsibility of the Hua + Deng system? Once again the people are the scapegoat for the leaders' failure.

Is Deng worthy of the people's confidence and trust? No leader can be granted the unconditional trust of the people. If he puts into practice a policy which benefits the people, peace and prosperity, yes [... otherwise, no]. Deng rushes to say that

without Mao, there could not be a new China and in his speech states that Mao's mistakes were peanuts. Does Deng Xiaoping fear an investigation which could lead to the ex-collaborators of Mao, such as Deng himself? Or does he intend to maintain Mao's policies?

If the first question is correct, he can remain cool. We do not blame Deng Xiaoping for past errors but he has to drive the country towards democracy and prosperity. If the second question is correct then [there should be] no compromise: it does not matter if Deng Xiaoping recently was the best, if we are now given back despotism with its sequence of economic mistakes...

If Deng Xiaoping does not care for the people's plight and for the return



Tansuo special edition: Is Deng worthy?

of basic rights, if he condemns the spontaneous democratic movement as an opportunity to make trouble, it means he does not want democracy. Why such a lack of confidence in the people? What can democracy mean without freedom of speech, freedom to criticise? Just explain to us what the difference is between that sort of democracy and Mao's despotism.

The blossoming of various opinions is the guarantee that despotism cannot come back. When Deng Xiaoping came back into power, he gave the impression that he had broken with the Mao type of despotism. So remember how on Tiananmen Square the people shed their blood to support him...

FEER 11m.

Wei Jingsheng, who was arrested by the Peking Security Bureau on March 29, had been an electrician at the Peking Zoo. Last year, as the democratic movement got under way in China, he became editor of *Explorations* (*Tansuo*). He is 26.

We print on this and the following page excerpts from two essays by Wei. The piece to the left first appeared in *Explorations*. Our translation is taken from the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, who's reporter René Vienet introduces the piece.

Below we reprint part of a twenty-page Peking wall poster dated March 3. Our translation is taken from the *New York Times*, May 7. In it Wei describes the notorious Qin Cheng prison outside of Peking. After writing this essay, Wei found himself incarcerated in the very same prison.

Traveling by car along the main road in the Changping suburb of Peking, you will come upon a hot-spring resort set in scenery as beautiful as a painting. You will be looking at the famous spa called Xiao Tang Shan. Tradition has it that the Dowager Empress, Tzu Hsi, often came to take the waters here.

If you continue toward the north, after a few minutes you will see a sign the size of a table on which it is written in several languages: "Foreigners not admitted." The uninitiated will think they have come to a prohibited military area. Those who know a little more of what is going on will instantly feel a pang of hidden terror, because if you keep on for a short stretch, you will come to the penitentiary for important political prisoners that is famous throughout China: Qin Cheng No. 1.

Electrified Barbed Wire

Both the main gate and the sentinel box are very ordinary looking. A stranger who wandered down here would not imagine that there was anything amiss. Beyond is the main part of Qin Cheng Prison, enclosed by walls three meters high topped with electrified barbed wire.

Qin Cheng is kept carefully isolated from the outside world. Only former prisoners and their families and close friends know about it. The prison is administered by the Fifth Department of the Ministry of Security, whose members alone handle its affairs; even ordinary police agents know nothing about them. The guards are also carefully selected. One criterion is age: prisoners report never seeing guards over 20. The guards are replaced by batches at regular intervals.

Prisoners are divided into four classes according to the amount they have to pay for their meals. However, corruption on both the personal and the institutional

MAJOR WORKS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA

On this page we customarily print bibliographies of recent materials which we believe will be of interest to SPEAHR members. The Spring issue featured a list of articles. Longer works appear below. In our next issue we will present a bibliography of human rights bibliographies.

- Amnesty International, *Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of China* (New York: Random House, \$3.95). A major and long-awaited report on the subject.
- Amnesty International (Japan), *State Secret: Taiwan's Political Prisoners* (Osaka, 400 yen). Two articles in English (by Karen Smith and Lynn Miles); the remaining articles in Japanese (concerning various political prisoners in Taiwan, conditions on Green Island, etc.).
- Chen Jo-hsi, *The Execution of Mayor Yin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, \$8.95). An insider's unique view, expressed through the medium of fictional short stories.
- Dreyer, June Teufel, *China's Forth Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press). The premier study of problems pertaining to ethnic minorities in China. [02]
- Eberstadt, Nick, "Has China Failed," *New York Review of Books*, April 5 and May 7, 1979. Two lengthy articles which conclude that "serious hunger and illiteracy . . . probably persist" in China. [25, 26]
- Griffin, Patricia E., *The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counter-revolutionaries: 1924-49* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, \$15).
- Mao Tse-tung on Intellectuals: *A Selection of Speeches and Writings from the 1950s*, special issue of *Chinese Law and Government*, winter 1978-79.
- Mitchell, Richard H., *Thought Control in Prewar Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, price varies between \$5.95 and \$12.50 for hard cover). An important study of the Showa era.
- Moody, Peter R., *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary China* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, \$14.95). Very useful, despite some surprising omissions concerning the democratic parties in the 1950s.
- Kawata Yasuyu, *Prisoner of Conscience: Chen Yu-hsi* (Honolulu: 21st Century Books, 941 Prospect St.). Translation of a 1972 Japanese book concerning Chen Yu-hsi of Taiwan. Chen was imprisoned by the Chinese Nationalists between 1968 and 1975.
- Ting, Lee-Hsia Hsu, *Government Control of the Press in Modern China, 1900-1949* (Cambridge, Mass: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, \$9.00). An important study of Chinese Nationalist repression.
- U.S. Senate, *Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*. . . , February 5-22, 1979 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office). A lengthy (891 pp.) record of the Taiwan hearings, with numerous documents and reprinted articles, some dealing with human rights on the island.
- Weeramantry, C.G., *Equality and Freedom: Some Third World Perspectives* (Colombo: Hansa Publishers Ltd., 22 Clifford Ave.). Although not specifically about East Asia, this book nonetheless provides a useful Asian perspective by a distinguished Sri Lankan jurist.
- White, Gordon, *The Politics of Class and Class Origin: The Case of the Cultural Revolution* (Canberra: Australian National University, US \$3.00). Concerning the major question of social equality in China: the problem of those who have parents of "bad origin"—bourgeois intellectuals, landlords, etc.

level prevents the prisoners from getting what they are officially allotted.

The official ration, for instance, is about 35 pounds of food a month for each prisoner; but prisoners who never get to exercise cannot eat even half of that. The entire amount is nonetheless purchased every month, even though what is left over cannot be stored. According to some, it is fed to pigs that the guards raise and in turn sell to supplement their own diet. Others report more ingenious methods.

Certain of these methods double as punitive measures. For example, one of the lightest and most common punishments at Qin Cheng is to first starve the prisoner and then give him or her a bowl of noodles heavy with grease as "compensation." Most, of course, get sick upon eating this and have to miss the next few meals as well.

All the inmates are in separate cells. Their 3-by-9-foot cells contain a bunk made of planks covered with thin bedding, a chamber pot and a basin of water. There is one black uniform for the summer and one for the winter. . . .

Irrational regulations of every sort govern the lives of the inmates. For instance, they have to sleep facing the door; to turn one's back to it is against the rules. Should you turn in your sleep, you will be awakened, and awakened repeatedly until you have learned to keep your face to the glass pane.

A certain Tibetan, after sleeping on one side of his face for more than 10 years, developed a swollen ear that became numb and eventually infected. He tried sleeping on his other side, but was incessantly awakened and scolded by the guards

until, driven beyond endurance, he went berserk and tried to strangle them. Only then was he granted a special dispensation to turn in his sleep.

Sanitary conditions are also poor for the prisoners. No soap is ever given. The regulations permit bathing, but only once a month, regardless of the season.

The irony is that these unusually gifted individuals joined the Communist Party to fight for the freedom and well-being of China and of mankind, and consequently devoted the better part of their lives to obtaining and maintaining the party's political dominance.

The torments of daily life alone would not suffice to break these people of exceptional willpower. Qin Cheng is also supposed to be equipped with various modern instruments of torture, for example, exposing the victim day and night to a light so strong that after a while he feels he is going crazy.

Wang Guangmei, when she was eating her corn bread and cabbage soup at Qin Cheng, supposedly lost her reason as a result of prolonged torture. When the wife of a high cadre went to visit her, her appearance was hardly human. The sight was such that this woman could not rest with its memory and at the risk of impairing her own family interests, wrote a letter to Mao Zedong.

Deaths were also frequent. Neither family nor friend could know whether the person was dead or alive. . . .

This letter, together with a general feeling of indignation among the cadres, eventually led to a change in command after the end of the Cultural Revolution, from the Ministry of Security to Unit 8341, which restored the administration of Qin

Cheng to a "relatively civilized" level.

The most common form of torture is simple beating. You are called out and surrounded by a group of men who slug and kick until you are bruised and bloody and completely breathless.

There are those who, unable to endure such conditions, try to commit suicide. Others go on hunger strikes. The Panchen Lama, for instance, once refused nourishment, declaring that he did not want to go on living: "You can take my body to the Central Committee."

That Qin Cheng should have remained unknown for so long was due in large part to the fact that almost no one was let out before the 1970's. It was also extremely rare before the end of the Cultural Revolution for anyone to receive permission to visit. Thus it was common for people to remain incarcerated for more than 10 years.

In 1975 Deng Xiaoping suggested releasing Qin Cheng's political prisoners. Going along with the "reversal of verdicts" movement of the time, many old party members were freed. To them this was an altogether unexpected piece of luck.

But a sudden overwhelming emotion of joy can sometimes be dangerous. To "insure safety and health," the Central Committee adopted a policy of exile. In 1975, all who left Qin Cheng had to first spend some time at a hospital to absorb the shock of going back into the world. After 1977, the hospital was no longer considered necessary. Instead the prisoners were sent to distant, out-of-the-way villages whose quiet surrounding supposedly served just as well to soften the violent shock of liberation. . . .

GUIDE TO SOURCE CITATIONS

† This symbol indicates that our source is a broadcast transcript. Before the † will appear the location of broadcasting station, and the date of origin. "Date of origin" means the date of the original report, which in some cases will be the date the report was first published (as in a newspaper), rather than date of broadcast. If different, the FBIS date follows the †. (U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*). FBIS volume number (IV, in the case of the People's Republic of China) is omitted if obvious. Years are not indicated except for items more than 9 months old. Broadcast dates are Greenwich Mean Time.

[] A two-digit number in brackets indicates the relevant article of the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). See page 2.

TRANSLITERATION OF CHINESE: The Pinyin system is used, with the following exceptions when appropriate: (1) Non-Mandarin place names, if such names are either very common "household words" in English, or not originally Chinese-language names (e.g. Tibet, Urumchi); (2) Well known ("household word") historical non-PRC personages (Confucius, Sun Yat-sen); (3) Names of people and places outside the People's Republic of China (including pre-1949 personages who left the mainland around 1949). (Names in pre-1979 reports often appear in modified Wade-Giles because retransliteration is not feasible.)

A April
a August
AFP Agence France Presse
AH Anhui Province
AW *Asiaweek*
BJ Beijing (Greater Peking)
BR *Beijing Review*
C China, People's Republic of
c circa
D December
F February
FEER *Far Eastern Economic Review*
FJ Fujian Province
GD Guangdong Province
GM *Guangming Daily*
GS Gansu Province
GX Guangxi (Zhuang) Autonomous Region
GZ Guizhou Province
HB Hubei Province
HEB Hebei Province
HEN Henan Province
HK Hong Kong
HL Heilongjiang Province
HN Hunan Province
I January
J June
j July
JL Jilin Province

JP Japan
JS Jiangsu Province
JX Jiangxi Province
K Kyodo
LN Liaoning Province
M March
m may
MPR Mongolian People's Republic
N November
NK North Korea
NM Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia) Autonomous Region
NX Ningxia (Hui) Autonomous Region
NYT *New York Times*
o October
PD *People's Daily*
PRC People's Republic of China
QH Qinghai Province
R Reuters
S September
SC Sichuan Province
SD Shandong Province
SH Greater Shanghai
Sh *SPEAHRhead*
SK South Korea
SN Shaanxi (Shensi) Province
SX Shanxi (Shansi) Province
T Tibet (Xizang Autonomous Region)

TJ Tianjin (Greater Tientsin)
TK Tokyo
TW Taiwan (Republic of China)
U Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
XH Xinhua (New China News Agency)
XJ Xinjiang (Uygur) Autonomous Region
YN Yunnan Province
ZJ Zhejiang Province

Check the box below if you are willing to participate in letter-writing campaigns in connection with non-violent political prisoners in any part of East Asia. A few times a year you will be asked to write several letters on behalf of such prisoners of conscience in China, Taiwan, Korea, Mongolia and/or Soviet East Asia. Information about each case will be supplied, along with letter-writing advice, officials' addresses, etc.

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
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Humane solutions to social problems are unlikely to result from inhumane methods. For this reason, we seek a reduction in the amount of violence in China, Taiwan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and Soviet East Asia.

But our conception of non-violence is a broad one. It is as violent to permit people to starve as it is to torture them. It is as violent to imprison people because of their beliefs as it is to kidnap them for ransom.

We are confident that the best solutions to the many social and economic problems will emerge from within these societies, once the various political groups interact non-violently—i.e., respect each other's human rights. We are convinced that ruling groups waste much of their nations' resources and human energy when they attempt to eliminate dissent. And when a particular social policy is adopted simply because its advocates enjoy the preponderance of force, there is no reason to believe that the policy is more desirable for the people affected than alternative policies.

Only when the issues are debated by a public with access to a range of ideas and information, do we have some reason to hope that the more socially advantageous paths will be followed by those in authority.

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